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Plea-Bargaining, Negotiating Confessions and
Consensual Resolution of Criminal Cases*

STEPHEN C. THAMAN

1. Introduction
The “full-blown” trial with “all the guarantees”1 is no longer affordable. With
the rise in crime and the more cost-, and labor-intensive procedures required
by modern notions of due process, legislatures and courts are gradually giving
priority to the principle of “procedural economy” and introducing forms of
consensual and abbreviated criminal procedures to deal with overloaded
dockets. After decades of biting criticism of American plea bargaining as a
form of “bargaining with justice,”2 one cannot help but recognize a “triumphal
march of consensual [and other less costly] procedural forms.”3
*

Session VB.
National Reports received from: Brazil (BR), A. P. Zomer; Bulgaria (BU), J. Iontcheva Turner;
Croatia (CR), D. Krapac; Denmark (DE), R.Wandall; Germany (GE), K. Altenhain; Italy (IT),
M. Ferraioli; Norway (NO), A. Strandbakken; Netherlands (NE), C. H. Brants-Langeraar;
Poland (PO), M. Rogacka-Rzewnicka; South Africa (SA), A. Skeen; Scotland (SC), F. Leverick
& P. Duff; Spain (SP), C. Samanes Ara; US, J. Ross.
1
Art. 24 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution guarantees to those accused of crimes the right to
a defense, to the assistance of counsel, as well as “a public trial without undue delays and with
all the guarantees …” Constitución Espanola de 17 de Diciembre de 1978 (BOE no. 311, Dec.
29, 1978 [RCL 1978, 2836]), text reprinted in J. Muerza Esparza (Ed.), Ley de Enjuiciamiento
Criminal y otras Normas Procesales (1998).
2
Cf. K. F. Schumann, Der Handel mit der Gerechtigkeit (1977).
3
Th. Weigend, Die Reform des Strafverfahrens. Europäische und deutsche Tendenzen und
Probleme, l04 Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 486, 493 (l992).
K. BOELE WOELKI & S. VAN ERP (EDS.), General Reports of the XVIIth Congress of the
International Academy of Comparative Law – Rapports généraux du XVIIe Congrès de
l’Académie Internationale de Droit Comparé, 951-1011.
© 2007 STEPHEN C. THAMAN. Printed in The Netherlands.
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“Consensual” procedural forms are part and parcel of criminal procedure
reforms worldwide and are driven by the desire for procedural economy: to
either avoid the formal preliminary investigation by investigating magistrate
or prosecutor and the preparation of an exhaustive investigative dossier,
typical of inquisitorial systems patterned after the continental European
“civil law” model of criminal procedure, or the formal, oral, increasingly
adversarial trial which has been complicated by the increase in procedural
guarantees given to criminal defendants and rendered more unpredictable to
the extent that lay judges are given control over the issue of guilt.4 As these
reforms are instituted, one hears the complaints of legal scholars who bemoan
a compromise of important principles of criminal procedure, most important
among them being the compromise of the search for truth and the legality
principle, requiring mandatory prosecution as a guarantee of equal protection
before the law.5 The dispute over the advisability of guilty pleas and pleabargaining is probably at its most heated in relation to the introduction of pleabargaining in the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR), where one is dealing with crimes against
humanity, genocide and mass murders which require a delicate balancing of:
(1) the economic interests of the international community which funds the
court; (2) the interests of victims and the international community in having
the perpetrator accept responsibility for their acts and express remorse; and
(3) the interest of the international community, the parties to the conflict and
the victims in having a full and accurate historical record of the events during
the conflict.6
This report will explore the various types of consensual procedures which
make up the procedural arsenals of modern criminal justice systems and try
to flesh out how and if they have contributed to procedural economy in the
respective country and whether or not important procedural principles have
been compromised which undermine the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system. I sent an elaborate questionnaire7 to the country reporters8 which,
4

See M. Damaska, Negotiated Justice in International Criminal Courts, 2 J. Int’l Crim. Just.
1018, 1022-23 (2004)
5
A. Eser, Funktionswandel von Prozeßmaximen, 104 Zeitschrift für die Gesamte
Strafrechtswissenschaft 361, 373 (1992).
6
G.-J. A. Knoops, Theory and Practice of International and Internationalized Criminal
Proceedings 264 (2005). Cf. Damaska, supra note 4, at 1031, who feels that admissions
in exchange for a reduced sentence will not necessarily have a salutary impact, but “if his
self-incrimination appears to be motivated by a change of heart rather than by personal risk
calculations, then his self-condemnation can exert a strong effect on his followers, making them
more likely to confront the reprehensible nature of their own conduct.”
7
See Appendix 1.
8
This report will refer to the country reports provided by the respective rapporteurs and to
other materials gathered by the general rapporteur. For citation purposes, I will use a twoletter abbreviation for the country (usually the first two letters), and the page number of the
report. The contribution from Prof. Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, University of Utrecht, on

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2591467
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besides addressing the forms of consensual resolution of criminal cases such
as diversion, penal orders, stipulations to the correctness of the charges, plea
bargains or confession bargaining, also sought certain basic information
about the relative complexity and formality of both the mode of pretrial
investigation and the mode of trial used in the respective countries. This is
important, for the more complicated and formal the pretrial stage, the more
necessities of procedural economy will favor simplifying or leaping this stage
of the proceedings. The same holds true for the relative complexity, and, in
the case of jury trials, the relative unpredictability of the mode of trial,9 which
will lead to increased use of plea-bargaining or other mechanisms to simplify
or avoid the full-blown criminal trial.
The country rapporteurs were also asked about the amount of discretion
prosecutors have in charging cases, or in dismissing charges (during negotiations
for instance) for countries with complete prosecutorial discretion (opportunity
principle) such as the US might tend to have less theoretical aversion to pleabargaining10 whereas those which deny prosecutorial discretion (legality
principle)11 are usually antipathetical to “bargaining with justice.” As can be
seen in the country reports, most countries following the “legality principle”
have allowed a certain level of discretion in charging, based on assessments
of the prospect of a conviction,12 and have also introduced the “opportunity
principle” for less serious crimes,13 thus opening the door for diversion, penal
orders and consensual resolution of the less serious cases. In Denmark and
the Netherlands, prosecutorial guidelines determine what kinds of crimes
are subject to discretionary prosecution.14 In the Netherlands, negotiations
International Criminal Tribunals, is from his book, supra note 6. I have consulted a number of
other codes of criminal procedure of countries for which no country report was available. These
codes are listed in Appendix 2 and use a similar abbreviated format. For instance, cites to the
Moldovan Code of Criminal Procedure will be in the following format: MO (§425 CCP).
9
Damaska, supra note 4, at 1022-23, emphasizing the function of unpredictability in this
sense.
10
US (p. 1), where plea bargaining is wide-open. But Norway, while recognizing the opportunity
principle if there are “weighty reasons” for not charging, NO (pp. 1-2), is a country that
generally frowns on plea-bargaining. SC (pp. 1-2) clearly recognizes the opportunity principle
but prosecutorial guidelines tend to map out the areas where discretion should normally be
exercised; SA (pp. 1-3) also recognizes the opportunity principle across the board, but frowns
on plea bargaining. France, which also recognizes the opportunity principle, was a great enemy
of plea-bargaining as well, until 2004.
11
For countries generally accepting the legality principle: GE (p. 1); DE (pp. 2-3, 13-14); NE
(p. 2); CR (p. 2); BU (p. 3); PO (p. 1); BR (p. 1); see also IT (p. 1), where the principle is
enshrined in Art. 112 of the Constitution.
12
For instance: IT (p. 1); DE (pp. 3-6, 14-15); NE (p. 2).
13
See BR (p. 1); PO (p. 1); CR (p. 2); GE (p. 10). Langer sees a softening of the legality
principle in Guatemala (1994), Costa Rica (1998) and Chile (2000-2003) as well. M. Langer,
From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the
Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 Harv. Int’l L. J. 1, 28 (2004).
14
DE (pp. 5-6); NE (pp. 4-5).
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between prosecution and defense before charging probably only happens, and
then secretly, when the prosecutor is facing a more powerful adversary, such
as a defense lawyer representing a powerful enterprise charged with a white
collar offense or an organized crime syndicate.15
Prosecutorial discretion not to charge is also limited in many countries
by procedures which allow the aggrieved party (whether victim or relatives
of deceased victims) to seek to compel the prosecutor to charge,16 or even
to bring charges themselves independently through private prosecution.17
In many jurisdictions a judge will perform a screening function to weed out
groundless charges presented by the public prosecutor or even victims acting
as private prosecutors.18 This was traditionally the function of the investigating
magistrate in inquisitorial systems,19 is carried out by a pretrial judge in other
systems,20 and even by the trial judge in a pretrial hearing on occasion.21 Once
a case has been charged, the prosecutor will often require the consent of a
judge, usually the trial judge,22 to dismiss the charges, and here too the victim
15

NE (pp. 2-3).
Classically the German Klageerzwingungsverfahren allows the victim to appeal to a judge
to compel prosecution, GE (p. 13); NE (p. 9, “Article 12 Procedure”). Similarly: BU (p. 3); IT
(p. 5). In Poland, the judge can compel the prosecutor to twice review the case and if he or she
refuses to charge, the victim may proceed through private prosecution, PO (pp. 8-11). In the US
(p. 1) there is no right to private prosecution, nor to ask a judge to compel prosecution. In SC
(p. 6) the victim has a theoretical right to compel prosecution in serious “solemn” cases, but this
remedy has only been granted two times in Scottish history. In other countries there is only a
right to appeal to a hierarchically higher prosecutor, DE (p. 15); NO (p. 3); BR (p. 2). In SC (p.
5) the prosecutor, since 2005, is required to give the victim a written explanation why charges
were not preferred, but there is no way to get a judge to compel charging.
17
A complaint of the victim is required for public prosecution of certain minor offenses, and
even rape in some countries: PO (p. 2). It is required for statutory rape in NE (p. 8). Private
prosecution without obligatory participation of the public prosecutor is allowed for minor
offenses in GE (pp. 14-15); DE (p. 15); CR (pp. 6-7); NO (p. 4, only for defamation); BU (p. 5);
BR (p. 2); IT (p. 5). The victim may participate as an auxiliary prosecutor with full procedural
rights sitting alongside the public prosecutor in PO (p. 7), Spain, and Germany, a provision
mainly for sexual assault cases.
18
No such judicial screening exists in NE (p. 7) or SC (pp. 3-4).
19
For the French procedure as related to victim’s complaints, see S. C. Thaman, Comparative
Criminal Procedure: A Casebook Approach 21-23 (2002). See also CR (p. 5-6), where the
investigating magistrate’s rejection may be reviewed by a panel of three judges if the prosecutor
refuses to dismiss, a procedure similar to that in France.
20
See SA (p. 1); the giudice dell’udienza preliminare in IT (p. 4). In SA (p. 1) and US, in the
case of preliminary hearings, the procedure is public and adversarial. W. R. la Fave et al.,
Criminal Procedure 714-39 (4th ed. 2004). But the US also is the only country still using the
highly secret, inquisitorial grand jury, a group of anywhere from 6 to 23 lay persons which
screens prosecutorial charges without any defense participation. Id. at 740-796.
21
GE (p. 9); PO (p. 10); BR (p. 2).
22
NE (pp. 9-10); BU (p. 6); PO (p. 12); BR (p. 3); IT (p. 5). Minor exceptions are allowed in
some countries: in GE (p. 12, 18) for individual charges in multi-count accusatory pleadings,
and cases subject to victim-offender conciliation and other narrow categories of offenses; in DE
16
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may have a role in seeing that the case continues on to trial and judgment
according to the normal procedures.23
It is also important to know whether the pretrial investigation yields
a comprehensive file or dossier from which trial judges (and parties) can
evaluate whether the evidence is sufficient to prove guilt in cases of consensual
resolution. The investigative file of classic inquisitorial systems which was
supposed to be the repository of all admissible evidence and whose contents,
whether in the form of witness statements, reports of investigative acts, or
expert reports, were all presumptively admissible,24 would naturally provide
an excellent documentary basis for the finding of guilt in a case which did not
go to trial.25 The informal police investigation,26 which, as in the U.S., only
produces isolated police reports and witness statements which are not always
subject to full disclosure to the defense, would tend to be the least reliable
basis for assessing the factual basis for a guilty plea.27
Reforms in formerly inquisitorial countries are, however, gradually
changing the methodology and the aims of the formal preliminary
investigation. First, the preliminary investigation has been opened up to more
defense participation in the form of the ability to make evidentiary motions
before the chief investigator, whether it be investigating magistrate,28 public

(pp. 16-17) for cases punishable by fines, juvenile cases, etc. In SC (pp. 6-7), no decision of the
public prosecutor to dismiss has ever been judicially reviewed, despite a theoretical possibility
to do so. If the public prosecutor moves to dismiss in a case where victim is acting as auxiliary
or private prosecutor, in some countries the victim may continue prosecuting the case, DE (p.
17); CR (p. 7).
23
In BU (pp. 6-7) the victim may assume responsibility for the prosecution in such cases. The
public prosecutor has unlimited power to dismiss charges without judicial approval in SA (p.
3); CR (p. 7); NO (p. 4). In Spain, the aggrieved party may act as private prosecutor and any
member of the public as “popular prosecutor” in any criminal case independently of whether
the public prosecutor intends to continue with the prosecution. See Thaman, supra note 19, at
23-28.
24
This holds true in Russia and many of the former Soviet republics. It presumably holds true
in France, NE (pp. 3-4), CR (p. 1) and other countries that have maintained the investigating
magistrate and the formal preliminary investigation. In Brazil, the entire investigative file is
given to the jury when they retire to deliberate. §476 Código de Processo Penal, in D. E. De
Jesus (Ed.), Código de Processo Penal Anotado (7th ed. 1989).
25
It also allows the judge to take an active role in assessing whether there is a factual basis for
the guilty plea. Langer, supra note 13, at 15.
26
DE (p. 5); SA (p. 1); NO (p. 1); SC (p. 1).
27
Langer notes that reforms have reduced the importance of the written dossier in Italy (1989),
Argentina (federal) 1992, Guatemala (1994), Buenos Aires (1998), Paraguay (1999), Venezuela
(1999), Chile (2000-03). Langer, supra note 13, at 28.
28
CR (p. 3); this is also true in France and Spain in the jury trial cases and perhaps in abbreviated
procedure cases.
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prosecutor29 or other official.30 The theory behind the prohibition of defense
investigations was typically the notion that pretrial contact with a witness by a
party contaminated the witness, undermining his or her credibility.31 In some
countries there is a theoretical right of the defense, in cases where a suspect has
been arrested and preliminarily charged, to be present during all investigative
acts and to actively solicit evidence in an adversarial type setting.32 Finally, Italy
took the radical step, which has been followed in other countries, to declare
the prima facie inadmissibility of all evidence collected in the preliminary
investigation dossier, unless it cannot be repeated at trial, thus requiring the
parties to conduct depositions of witnesses with full confrontation rights of
their adversaries when there is a danger the witness will not be available for
trial due to death, illness, or illegal threats.33 In addition, Italy has not only
accorded the defense the right to conduct its own pretrial investigations,34 as
occurs in the United States and other common law countries,35 but has set out
codified guidelines for the defense collection of evidence and its preservation
in a defense file, which is then consolidated with the file of the prosecutor at
the end of the pretrial phase.36
The more comprehensive and two-sided the pretrial investigation and the
more adversarial the taking of evidence in the pretrial stages, the more the
consensual modes of trial, whether in the form of guilty pleas, stipulations or
abbreviated trials, will be able to make claims of truth-approximation. This
theoretical approach has its adherents in Germany, where several voices in the
literature have called for again making the preliminary investigation the most
important stage in the criminal process to the extent it performs the function
of comprehensively collecting the evidence while protecting the defense right
to put it to an adversarial test. Thus, consensual resolution will be on firm
footing and, if consensus is not achieved, the trial itself can be streamlined due
29

The Netherlands, perhaps the most inquisitorial country in Europe, allows no independent
defense investigation, compelling the defense to funnel any evidence through the prosecutor
and/or investigating magistrate, NE (pp. 1-2, 5). In GE (p. 2), the prosecutor must question
witnesses suggested by the defense, but they can also be subpoenaed directly to testify at trial.
30
In Russia, an investigator attached to the Ministry of the Interior heads the investigation,
under supervision of the public prosecutor, and can hear motions of the defense. RU (§§46, 47,
86 CCP). The defense must ask the police to question a witness in NO (p. 2).
31
NE (p. 5). BR (p. 1) also prohibits independent defense collection of evidence.
32
For instance in Spain. See Thaman, supra note 19, at 34-39.
33
In relation to Italy, and the procedure before the Spanish jury courts, see S. C. Thaman, Spain
Returns to Trial by Jury, 22 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 241, 281-82 (1998).
34
Many countries allow defense investigations, either in an informal uncodified manner, GE
(p. 2), DE (p. 6), CR (p. 2), or while codified, without procedural clarification of the rules to be
followed or the admissibility of the fruits thereof, NO (p. 2).
35
SC (p. 2).
36
IT (p. 2, §§391 bis et seq. CPP-Italy); N. Triggiani, La L. 7 diciembre 2000 N. 397 (Disposizioni
in materia di indagini difensive): Prime riflessioni, Cassazione Penale (2001), Nos. 7-8, #1120,
at 2272-91.
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to the pretrial preservation of crucial sources of evidence.37 There is, however,
a real danger if consensual (or other alternative) procedures lead to a skipping
of both a formal preliminary investigation and a formal trial, for it will then be
difficult for the sentencing judge to ascertain whether there is a factual basis
for a finding of guilt.38
Certain procedural mechanisms not necessarily related to the giving of
consent by the defendant can, however, achieve the same end of skipping
the formal preliminary investigation, or avoiding a full trial (by jury) with
all the guarantees. Typical among these are expedited trials, usually where
the defendant is arrested in flagrante or the evidence is otherwise clear due
to an unequivocal confession or other manifest proof, where the prosecutor,
without consent of the defendant, can immediately send the case to the trial
court.39 In cases where the evidence is actually overwhelming, of course, many
of these cases will not end up in full-blown formal trials, but in consensual
resolution of one kind or the other. Finally, many countries provide for a more
expeditious police or prosecution investigation of the case, in lieu of the fullblown preliminary investigation, or a complete skipping of the preliminary
investigation or preliminary hearing40 for less-serious crimes, which could be
an incentive for a prosecutor to undercharge a case to gain the obvious saving
of time and investigative resources.
37
Weigend, supra note 3, at 506 ff; J. Wolter, Aspekte einer Strafprozessreform bis 2007 79-91
(1991).
38
Some voices in countries in transition from an inquisitorial to an adversarial form of procedure,
feel it is more important to leap over or simplify the cumbersome, pedantic preliminary
investigation with its long periods of pretrial detention, and maintain a full adversarial trial.
After all, the state’s incapacity to bring defendants to trial in a reasonable time is the reason for
long periods of pretrial detention, and yet the state uses this reason for “compelling” defendants
to accept judgment without trial through its “consensual” procedures.” G. E. Córdoba, El juicio
abreviado en el Código Procesal Penal de la Nación, in J. B. J. Maier & A. Bovino (Eds.), El
Procedimiento Abreviado 241-245 (2001), citing Bovino.
39
BU (p. 11); in IT (p. 19), the public prosecutor may skip the preliminary investigation and
the preliminary hearing in flagrant cases by choosing giudizio direttissimo or in cases involving
otherwise clear evidence by choosing a giudizio immediato, which can result in the setting
of trial within 15 days. See S. C. Thaman, Gerechtigkeit und Verfahrensvielfalt: Logik der
beschleunigten, konsensuellen und vereinfachten Strafprozessmodelle, in S. Machura & S.
Ulbrich (Eds.), Recht – Gesellschaft – Kommunikation: Festschrift für Klaus F. Röhl 307-09
(2003). Venezuela has introduced a similar provision which applies to flagrant crimes, but also
to crimes punishable by less than four years deprivation of liberty or fine only. VE (§§372-73
CPP). See also the procedure for “clear crimes, uncovered in the moment of their commission,”
MO (§513(1) CCP), which requires the police to submit a report of the crime to the prosecutor
within 12 hours and for the prosecutor, if she believes a crime has been committed, to refer the
case to the court, which must hear it within five days, with one five-day extension. MO (§§51518 CCP); cf. BE (§§452-59 CCP), which provides in clear cases where the suspect does not
deny responsibility, for submission of the case to the prosecutor within 10 days, whereupon the
case must be submitted to the judge who must set trial within five days.
40
Id. IT (pp. 8-9).
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Practices like correctionnalisation in France and Belgium,41 allow
prosecutors to manipulate the charges so as to avoid the jurisdiction of mixed42
or jury courts43 with lay participation, or the discretionary charging of “eitherway” offenses in England and Wales which would lead to less complicated
and more predictable trials before professional panels or, in the latter case,
by lay magistrates.44 While such procedures do not necessarily require the
41

Thaman, supra note 19, at 141. On Belgium, see Ch. Van den Wyngaert, Belgium, in Ch. Van
den Wyngaert (Ed.), Criminal Procedure Systems in the European Community 11 (1993).
42
Thus it is important to know which countries have mixed courts for the trial of more serious
offenses and trials before a professional judge or judges for less serious cases. GE (pp. 19-20),
has panels of 3 professional and two lay assessors for more serious felonies, like murder, panels
of one professional judge and two lay assessors for crimes punishable by from 2-4 years and
single judge trials for lesser offenses; CR (pp. 8-9) has a court composed of one professional
judge and two lay assessors for crimes punishable by 5-10 years, and of 2 professional judges
and 3 lay assessors if punishable in excess of 10 years; single judges try cases punishable by
less than five years; BU (p. 6) provides a mixed court of one professional and two lay judges
for crimes punishable by from 5-15 years and a mixed court of two professional and three lay
judges for those punishable in excess of 15 years, with single judges trying cases punishable by
less than 5 years; in IT (pp. 7-8), a mixed court of six lay judges sitting with two professional
judges hears all homicides and other cases punishable by imprisonment from 10 to 24 years,
single judges try cases punishable by up to 4 years, and 3 judge panels the rest; in SA (p. 4)
lay assessors must be appointed in murder trials and may be used to assess appropriateness
of sentence in regional courts. Only two Latin American countries have mixed courts: in BO
(§50 CCP) trial courts are staffed with two professional judges and three lay assessors and in
the Argentine province of Córdoba, with three professional judges and two lay assessors. R. J.
Cavallero, La Constitución Argentina. La Realidad Jurídica y un Reciente Ensayo de Tribunal
Mixto, in J. B. J. Maier et al. (Eds.), Juico por Jurados en el Proceso Penal 52 (2000).
43
For countries with jury trials for more serious crimes and professional panels for the others:
BR (p. 3, jury of seven, with one professional judge, for crimes against life only); for countries
with jury trials for more serious crimes, mixed courts for mid-range crimes and professional
panels for less serious crimes: DE (p. 20, jury of 12 with three professional judges for crime
punishable in excess of four years, and a mixed court consisting of one professional judge and
two lay assessors for lesser crimes; if a defendant gives a full confession, however, all cases
will be tried by a professional judge sitting alone); NO (p. 5, cases punishable by up to six
years tried by mixed court of one professional judge and two lay assessors, cases punishable
by in excess of six years, and appeals of the smaller mixed court, tried by mixed court of 3
professional judges and four lay assessors and appeals from court of 3 professional judges and
4 lay assessors tried by a jury of 10 sitting with three professional judges); SC (p. 8, jury of 15
and one professional judge for “solemn” offenses tried in the High Court and punishable by
life imprisonment); NI (§297 CCP), has a jury of five presided by one professional judge; PA
(§2332 Judicial Code) has a jury of seven presided by one professional judge. On the relatively
new Russian jury system, with a jury of 12, and Spanish system, with a jury of nine, both
presided over by a single judge for the trial of murders and some other offenses, see S. Thaman,
Europe’s New Jury Systems: the Cases of Spain and Russia, in N. Vidmar (Ed.), World Jury
Systems 326 (2000).
44
The Netherlands has been historically skeptical of lay participation and has neither a jury nor
a mixed court and uses three-judge panels for the more serious cases, and single judges for less
serious cases. NE (pp. 11-12). On ‘either-way’ offenses, see Thaman, supra note 19, at 141-3.
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consent of the defendant,45 they may be preceded by informal discussions or
negotiations between defense and prosecution and thus, in a sense, be akin
to plea-bargaining.46 In countries with jury systems, in which the right to
trial by jury is the right of the accused,47 and not exclusively the right of the
people to participate in the administration of justice,48 the waiver of the right
to jury trial could be the subject of negotiations, or could be subtly or not
too subtly coerced either by manipulative investigators, prosecutors or even
court-appointed defense lawyers,49 or by, for instance, a system of punishing
more leniently following a court trial than a jury trial.50
Finally, I believe it is important to recognize, that recognitions of guilt in
the form of confessions have been the great simplifier of criminal procedure
throughout its often ignominious history. Even where defendants were not
allowed to jurisdictionally will the end of criminal proceedings by entering
a plea of guilty, they were regularly either tortured or otherwise compelled,
threatened, induced, or inveigled to confess to the crime, which served
traditionally as the “queen of evidence” upon which professional judges,
juries or mixed courts would determine the guilt of the accused.51 It was the
great simplifier even of the formal, exhaustive preliminary investigation of
classic inquisitorial stamp,52 thus justifying the cessation of the gathering of
45

In SC (pp. 8-10), the public prosecutor has almost complete freedom to choose whether trial
will be by jury in the High Court, by “solemn” (full-blown) procedure in the Sheriff’s Court
(one professional judges, with maximum punishment of 5 years) or by summary procedure in
the Sheriff’s (3 month maximum) or peace courts (the latter with lay justices and maximum
punishment of 60 days). This situation would be “unthinkable” in England, Wales or the US
where the defendant controls whether the trial be by jury or judge (or lay magistrate). Id. p.
10.
46
Manipulative charging to influence the composition of the trial court is forbidden and may be
nullified by the court in several countries: CR (pp. 9-10); NO (p. 6); BU (p. 9); PO (p. 13); BR
(p. 4); IT (p. 8). It is possible that it occurs in DE (pp. 22-23) and could avoid judicial control.
47
Such as in the US and Russia. Thaman, supra note 43.
48
Such is the case in Spain, where the right to jury trial may not be waived. Id. Jury trial may
also not be waived in Denmark, P. Garde, The Danish Jury, 72 Rev. Int. de Droit Pénal (Lay
Participation in the Criminal Trial in the XXIst Century), 87, 89 (2001).
49
Thaman, supra note 43, at 326.
50
See a discussion of the court trial system in the city of Philadelphia, in S. J. Schulhofer, Is
Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1037, 1062-67 (1984).
51
Thaman, supra note 39, at 309. Damaska notes that the authorized use of coercion made it
unnecessary for continental European officials to have to make concessions to defendants to
get them to admit guilt, Damaska, supra note 4, at 1022. For the classic argument that plea
bargaining replaced torture as the vehicle for coercing confessions of guilt, J. H. Langbein,
Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3-22 (1978).
52
The 1877 Code of Criminal Procedure of Germany was introduced to put an end to inquisitorial
procedure with its introduction of a public and oral trial before a jury, GE (p. 74). Inquisitorial
procedure yielded in Denmark to adversarial procedure finally with reforms in 1919, DE (p.
2).
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circumstantial evidence of guilt, whether it be through independent witness
testimony, physical evidence, expert testimony, or even the simplifying of the
oral trial.
Systems in which a confessing defendant would achieve earlier release
from pretrial detention53 or is promised or expects mitigation in charging54 or
punishment55 upon confessing, can actually be viewed as systems of “pleabargaining,” even though those systems proclaim to be based on the legality
principle, the search for material truth, and are openly hostile to Americanstyle plea-bargaining.56 Nowadays, the guilty plea and the confession should
be treated in a procedurally similar fashion and there are some indications of a
move in this direction. Although nearly all systems allow police to interrogate
suspects even before the preliminary investigation has been initiated, some
even allotting them a certain number of hours or days for this purpose,57
most now recognize that a suspect should not be interrogated unless he or
she has been advised of the right to counsel58 and the right to remain silent59

53

In GE (p. 8), a detained suspect will be offered prospect of release from pretrial detention
due to absence of detention ground of obstruction of justice due to a confession; NE (p. 7) notes
that police do make promises of early release to induce confessions, but that this is technically
illegal.
54
GE (p. 8), admits that confessions are bargained for in exchange for instituting diversion
procedures, proceeding by way of penal order, requesting a mitigated punishment, etc.; DE (pp.
11-13) recognizes that pretrial confession bargaining exists in exchange for limiting the charges,
asking for less punishment, etc., but it is very controversial, with support among some voices
in the literature, and opposition among others who find it violates the principles of legality and
material truth as well as the prohibition of coerced confessions.
55
In NO (p. 3), police may tell a suspect that the penal code permits a 1/3 reduction in sentence
if a defendant has confessed; in BU (p. 4), while no bargaining is allowed for confessions, the
police often induce them by indicating the possibility of a mitigated sentence. Any promise to
release from detention or to mitigate the charges or punishment is illegal in: PO (p. 10); BR (p.
2); IT (p. 4); CR (p. 5).
56
In Japan, penal orders exist for minor criminality, a simple non-adversary trial for defendants
who confess (92% of all cases between 1987 and 1992) and an adversarial trial with more
severe punishment when one is convicted. D. T. Johnson, Plea Bargaining in Japan, in M. M.
Feeley & S. Miyazawa (Eds.), The Japanese Adversary System in Context 142-45 (2002).
57
Three to six days in NE (p. 6). In some countries police create an interrogation space illegally
by pretextually arresting a suspect for an administrative violation and then questioning about a
suspected crime: BU (p. 3); see FR (§63 CCP).
58
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (l966); GE (p. 4); SA (p. 2); DE (p. 7); NE (p. 6); CR (p.
4); BU (p. 4); NO (p. 2); PO (p. 10); BR (p. 1); IT (p. 2); SC (p. 3). In most countries, this of
course includes the right to court-appointed counsel in the case of indigence or the fact a person
is under pretrial arrest or detention. Miranda, supra; GE (p. 7); CR (p. 4); DE (p. 9); NO (p. 2);
BU (p. 5); IT (p. 3). In NE (pp. 6-7), the admonitions of the right to appointed counsel are only
given after the first interrogation.
59
Miranda, supra note 58; GE (p. 7); DE (p. 8); NE (pp. 6-7); CR (p. 4); NO (p. 2); BU (p. 3);
PO (p. 10); BR (p. 1); IT (p. 2); SC (p. 2).
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and waives those rights.60 Violations of these rules, called Miranda-rights
in the US, will lead in some countries to inadmissibility of the statements
subsequently obtained,61 in other countries not.62 The prohibition may be
extended to evidence indirectly discovered through the interrogation as well,63
such as evidence of crime, witnesses, or subsequent legal statements that
come on the heels of inadmissible statements.64 The doctrine of “fruits of the
poisonous tree,” however, is not recognized in some countries.65 Some systems
allow waiver of the right before one has seen counsel,66 and others insist that
the defendant consult with counsel before commencing the interrogation.
Some systems will allow counsel to be present during the interrogation, but
the defendant may waive this right.67 Others allow the defendant to waive
counsel before having spoken with one or to waive the right of counsel to
be present during questioning.68 Others do not allow counsel to be present
unless the investigating official grants permission69 or allow questioning if
defense counsel does not appear after having been notified.70 Finally, a few
countries disallow use of any statement made by a defendant in the absence
of counsel.71 An argument can be made for requiring counsel to be present
during interrogation, just as counsel is required for all consensual procedures
designed to elicit procedure-ending or procedure-simplifying admissions or
stipulations.
60
See in general, S. C. Thaman, Miranda in Comparative Law, 45 Saint Louis U. L. Rev. 581624 (2001).
61
DE (p. 8, where not advised of right to remain silent); NE (p. 7, as long as the suspicion
in relation to the person questioned had crystallized enough for him to be a suspect rather
than a “witness”.); CR (p. 5); BU (p. 4); BR (p. 1); IT (p. 2, extending inadmissibility to even
spontaneous statements made in absence of counsel).
62
NO (p. 3); in Germany the statement is prima facie inadmissible, GE (p. 5), but if the
seriousness of the crime outweighs the seriousness of the Miranda-violation, the evidence
may be usable. Cf. Thaman, supra note 19, at 104-08; Thaman, supra note 60, at 606-08. In
Scotland, a strict exclusionary rule has given way to a more flexible “case-by-case” approach
based in the discretion of the trial judge, SC (p. 3).
63
So-called “fruits of the poisonous tree” PO (p. 10); CR (p. 5).
64
GE (p. 6), will suppress a subsequent legal statement if suspect not advised that earlier
statement was improperly obtained.
65
GE (p. 6), unless the violation is particularly egregious; DE (p. 9), allows use of contents
of illegal interrogations to continue the investigation; NE (p. 7); NO (p. 3); BR (p. 2), within
discretion of judge to admit. In Italy the doctrine of fruits of the poisonous tree is not recognized
in relation to statements taken in violation of the admonition requirement. R. VanCleave, Italy,
in C. M. Bradley (Ed.) Criminal Procedure. A Worldwide Study 264 (1999).
66
Miranda v. Arizona; BU (p. 5).
67
DE (p. 7); PO (p. 10); BR (p. 2).
68
DE (p. 7).
69
NO (p. 2); GE (p. 4); NE (p. 6); SC (p. 3).
70
PO (p. 10).
71
IT (pp. 2-3); CR (p. 5); SA (pp. 2-3); RU (§75(2)(1) CCP).
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This report will discuss procedures for skipping the preliminary
investigation and a full-trial by use of pretrial diversion, victim-offender
conciliation, penal orders, and consensual modes of stipulations of guilt,
such as plea-bargaining. It will also discuss consensual means of simplifying
trials through negotiations of confessions or trial-simplifying evidentiary
concessions, up to the option of having a “trial on the file” with, if any, a
minimum of oral testimony to complement it.
I believe that the use of different procedures for different types of cases –
whether based on the seriousness of the threatened punishment, flagrancy, the
lack of controversy, etc. – should not necessarily mean that there will be more
“truth” or more “justice” for those who are tried “with all the guarantees”
than those who proceed to procedural resolution in swifter, less complicated
ways.72
In ancient times there was a diversity of procedures, ranging from
compositions, to duels, ordeals, use of compurgators or juries or Schöffen
depending on the particularities of the case.73 In the Middle Ages the old
Germanic Schöffengericht continued to exist alongside the new inquisitorial
procedures in the 16th Century German code, the Carolina.74 Written witness
statements could be used in French correctional courts, staffed by professional
judges, but not in its jury courts.75
Expedited, consensual and simplified forms also existed in the ancient and
pre-modern world. The precursor for expedited trials were the procedures
for suspects caught “red-handed”76 or “hand-having”.77 In one Anglo-Saxon
version of this procedure, the suspect gets “short shrift,” is not allowed to
make a statement and is promptly “hanged, beheaded or precipitated from
a cliff” perhaps even by the victim acting as executioner.78 Quite likely all
systems of resolving conflicts that we would today characterize as “criminal”
involved procedures which are analogous to the three main modes of
criminal procedure today: accusatorial-adversarial procedures, inquisitorial72

Thaman, supra note 39, at 317.
J. H. Dawson, A History of Lay Judges 121 (1960).
74
G. Radbruch, Zur Einführung in die Carolina, in G. Radbruch (Ed.) Die Peinliche
Gerichtsordnung Kaiser Karls V. Von 1532 (1975), at 21.
75
See No. 242, Crim. 404, 405 (1884), a decision of the French Court of Cassation, with
an English translation in Thaman, supra note 19, at 119-20. In fact, the French practice of
correctionnalisation and English trial of either-way offenses in the magistrates’ courts are
designed, often through anti-juridical manipulation of charging, to avoid trials in the jury
(or assizes) courts. Id. at 141-44. See J. Pradel, Procédure Pénale 97-99 (9th ed. 1997), who
emphasizes the “consensual” nature of this “illegal” but everyday practice.
76
On summary procedures for those caught “red-handed” in ancient England, see Th. A. Green,
Verdict According to Conscience. Perspectives on the English Criminal Trial Jury, 1200-1800
(1985), at 8.
77
On the German Handhaftverfahren, see Th. Weigend, Deliktsopfer und Strafverfahren 36
(1989).
78
Thaman, supra note 19, at 4.
73
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investigative procedures, and accusatorial-consensual procedures. Trials
by battle, by lining up platoons of oath-helpers to swear at each other, by
squaring off and heaping ridicule one on the other,79 were all precursors of
the Anglo-American adversary trial with attorneys squaring off against each
other and an independent trier of fact deciding the case. Trial by ordeal was a
kind of Divine inquisition, much like as if the judges would have inquired the
truth from oracles or from medicine men or soothsayers, and like the tortureladen Medieval Inquisitionsprozess it involved inflicting severe pain on the
suspect regardless of whether he or she were guilty or innocent. In Germanic
and Anglo-Saxon traditions there were the self-informing grand juries and
in Carolingian France the enquête du pais or the jury de dénonciation or the
inquisitio generalis of the Canon law;80 finally, most early customary legal
orders allowed for mediation and negotiation among accuser and accused
(and their clans or families) and the payment of a composition or wergeld. If
the family refused compensation or the culprit could not pay, then one of the
other modes of trial would proceed with the possibility of severe, even capital
punishment.81
In this regard it is important to realize that no country has only an
adversarial, inquisitorial or communitarian system of criminal justice. All
systems have existed, and continue to exist in all countries in varying degrees
as lateral or subsidiary traditions. Plea-bargaining à l’Américain is thus not
only a result of the accusatorial-adversarial nature of the American trial ethic
which allows the disponibilité of the charge, but also of more communitarian
notions of compromise and restoring the judicial peace. More importantly it
must be emphasized that plea-bargaining is just as much an offshoot of the
Inquisitionsprozess with its stress on inducing admissions of guilt by using
pressure, inducements, promises of leniency, if not outright torture. This will
become increasingly evident when we discuss the inherent coercive nature of
modern day American plea-bargaining.
It also should be kept in mind that the official paradigms of a system
of criminal justice unceasingly trumpeted by its ideologues, the university
79

It has been noted that such procedures existed, as well, in Croatia in the 10th through 12th
Centuries, CR (p. 23). On the custom in Greenland of having the two sides compete by seeing
who can sing the most ridiculous songs about the other, see U. Wesel, Frühformen des Rechts
in Vorstaatlichen Gesellschaften 133-34 (1985).
80
A. Esmein, A History of Continental Criminal Procedure with Special Reference to France
65-66 (1913).
81
For an example from 10th Century England, see Thaman, supra note 19, at 8. Cf. Montesquieu,
De L’Esprit des Lois, Vol. 1. (1748) 221 (GF-Flammarion 1979). On the rich buying their way
out of corporal punishment with the consent of the victim, see Weigend, supra note 77 at 6769, and SC (p. 18). On the existence of “consensual” forms of resolving criminal-type disputes
among the Nuer in Africa, where the wergeld took the form of payment in cows, in lieu of blood
revenge, see Wesel, supra note 79, at 256-58 (1985). See also NO (p. 10), for a description of
the transition from a family-based law based on revenge, to one based on compensation.
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professors, are not always the paradigms that dominate in the workaday world
of the courts in the interactions of police, prosecutors, judges and defense
lawyers. I have thus tried to get the country rapporteurs to assess the extent
to which informal bargaining for confessions or for the application of certain
alternative procedures exists in the corridors of courthouses if not in the
official codes. After all, American plea bargaining and the German practice of
Absprachen, which is now used in a rising percentage of cases, were originally
developed informally and only after many years were accepted by the courts
if not actually codified. I have also asked the country reporters to try to delve
into their country’s past to see if there were early versions of consensual
procedures that could be seen as the precursors of the modern variants.

2. Consensual Procedure Resulting in Dismissal with
Conditions
2.1. Diversion
To lessen the burden on the criminal courts, many countries have instituted
procedures similar to what is called “diversion” in the US,82 where a case,
usually involving less serious crimes,83 is suspended for a period of time84
82

Diversion was introduced in NO (p. 8) already in 1887 with the passage of its first code of
criminal procedure; in DE (p. 25) in 1932; in GE (p. 31), in 1974, with its scope being expanded
in 1987 and 1993; in IT (p. 13) in 1988, with expansion to the peace courts in 2000; and in 1995
in BR (p. 5) with its scope expanded in 2001. The composition pénale, a type of diversion, was
introduced in France in 1999. Langer, supra note 13, at 59, see also, C. Saas, De la composition
pénale au plaider-coupable: le pouvoir de sanction du procureur, Revue de Science Criminelle
et de Droit Pénal Comparé 827-42 (2004). Both diversion and the use of “fiscal fines” were
introduced in SC (pp. 10, 14) in 1988. Diversion applies to negligent or less serious crimes in
NI (§63 CCP). Cf. LA (§70(1)(4) CCP).
83
GE (pp. 11, 29, misdemeanors, see §153a(1) CCP-Germany); in DE (pp. 17, 25) diversion is
technically available in all crimes, but is usually applied to juvenile crimes punishable by fine
only; NE (pp. 14-15, transactie applies to misdemeanors and minor felonies punishable by up to
six years imprisonment); CR (pp. 2-3, applicable to crimes punishable by up to three years for
adults and up to five years for juveniles); in NO (p. 8) it is technically applicable to all crimes
and has been twice used in homicide cases (euthanasia, father killing mentally ill child); BU (p.
9, intentional crimes punishable by 3 years or less and reckless crimes punishable by 5 years
or less); in France, the composition pénale may be applied in any case punishable by less than
5 years, Saas, supra note 82, at 832; PO (p. 15, crimes punishable by up to 3 years); BR (p. 5,
crimes with minimum punishment of one year deprivation of liberty); IT (p. 11, juvenile cases
and cases before the justice of the peace, since the year 2000); SC (p. 11, “fiscal fines” apply to
all cases tried in the district courts, thus punishable by less than 60 days deprivation of liberty).
Diversion applies to negligent or less serious crimes in NI (§63 CCP) and LA (§415(3)(1) CCP)
and to slight or midlevel crimes which are not of significant danger to the community in MO
(§510 CCP).
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and certain conditions are imposed on the defendant, which, if fulfilled will
result in a dismissal of the case and the absence of any conviction. Typical
conditions are restitution,85 payment of money to a public institution86 or a
fine,87 community service work,88 drug or alcohol treatment,89 making support
payments,90 etc.91 Abstention from further criminal conduct is of course always
a condition.92 Naturally, the defendant must agree to fulfil the conditions and
this opens a space for bargaining between prosecution and defense both as
to the appropriateness of the diversion and the time and conditions it will be
subject to.93 In some countries, limitations are placed on which cases shall
be subject to diversion, such as the lack of public interest in pursuing the
crime94 or the borderline question of guilt,95 or even, on the contrary, that the
defendant confess his guilt.96
Diversion and the resulting dismissal has been criticized because in some
countries the alleged victim has no control over the decision not to pursue
a conviction.97 Furthermore, the institution has been considered to amount
84

Case suspended for: no more than 3 years in IT (p. 12); two years in BR (p. 5); one year
in MO (§511(1) CCP); six months in France, Saas, supra note 82, at 829. In NI (§64 (para.2)
CCP), suspension is for no less than two months and no more than three years.
85
NE (pp. 14-15); NO (p. 8); BU (p. 9); BR (p. 5); GE (p. 29); DE (p. 25); CR (pp. 2, 14); PO
(p. 18); IT (p. 12); NI (§63(para.2) CCP); MO (§510(2)(5) CCP); ES (§202(1) CCP); France,
Saas, supra note 82, at 829.
86
GE (p. 29); CR (pp. 2, 14).
87
NE (pp. 14-15, of up to 350 Euros); BU (p. 9, of from 250 to 500 US dollars); DE (p. 25);
France, Saas, supra note 82, at 830; in SC (pp. 11-12, the “fiscal fines,” were originally limited
to 25 pounds, though may now reach 100 pounds and reform proposals would raise them even
further).
88
NE (pp. 14-15); GE (p. 29); CR (pp. 2,14); NI (§65(4) CCP). In France, no more than 60
hours of community service work to be completed within 6 months (830) Saas, supra note 82,
at 830.
89
NE (pp. 14-15); DE (p. 25); CR (pp. 2,14); NI (§65(9) CCP).
90
CR (pp. 2, 14).
91
Under the Soviet era Russian CCP, cases involving minor misdemeanors were dismissed and
referred to “comrade’s courts” for informal administrative resolution. RSFSR (§51 CCP).
92
Such as in Danish “youth contracts,” DE (pp. 26-27); BR (p. 5); MO (§511(1)(3) CCP).
93
GE (p. 30); PO (p. 15); in BR (p. 5) there is sometimes informal bargaining about the amount
of restitution; although bargaining is not allowed or done in, NE (p. 14); CR (p. 15); BU (p.
10); IT (p. 12); SC (p. 14); in the Netherlands prosecutors sometimes have to bargain with white
collar defendants who have powerful lawyers representing them, NE (p. 15). On the “room for
bargaining” in relation to French compositions pénales, see Langer, supra note 13, at 59.
94
CR (pp. 2, 13); expressed in PO (p. 15) as minor dangerousness of the act.
95
GE (p. 29).
96
In Denmark, defendant must confess unconditionally and confession must be corroborated,
DE (pp. 17, 25-26); PO (p. 15), requires that guilt be clear and that the defendant will not
recidivate; confessions of guilt are required in NI (§63 CCP), PAR (§21 CCP), MO (§510(1)
CCP) and in France, Langer, supra note 13, at 59.
97
GE (p. 31); DE (p. 27); NE (p. 14); NO (p. 8); BU (p. 9); IT (p. 12), France, Saas, supra note
82, at 840. The victim does have a veto right in CR (p. 14).
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to a kind of Verdachtsstrafe in that sanctions are imposed without a finding
of guilt98 and by a prosecutor and not a judge.99 Undue pressure is put on
the defendant to accept the conditions, thus tending to violate the prohibition
against coercing admissions of guilt.100 It has been contended that the procedure
violates the principle of a public trial, allowing rich defendants to secretly buy
there way out of criminal liability and avoid prejudicial limelight,101 or that the
bureaucratic-administrative procedure results in a de facto decriminalization
eliminating blameworthiness in favor or payment of a “tax” on erstwhile
illegal activity.102 Nonetheless, a relatively large amount of cases are resolved
using diversion procedures in some countries which has helped to unburden
the courts.103

2.2. Victim-Offender Conciliation
The movement for restorative justice has been instrumental in the increasing
popularity of expanding procedures of victim-offender conciliation as an
alternative to criminal prosecution.104 The roots of this procedure can be found
98

In GE (p. 11), a dismissal per §153 StPO leads to a “hypothetical evaluation of guilt” whereas
§153a StPO requires determination of slight to middle-level guilt due to the imposition of
sanctions. It has been criticized as the imposition of punishment, in the form of “conditions”
based on mere suspicion, and because there is no judicial involvement, thus hearkening back
to inquisitorial procedures where the investigative official also decided the case and sentenced,
GE (p. 31). The ECHR has also made this criticism in Oztürk v. Germany (2.21.84), NE (pp.
14-15). The French injonction pénale was introduced by a law of December 22, 1994 but was
declared unconstitutional by the Conseil constitutionnel on February 2, 1995, on the basis that
the prosecution was essentially issuing a judgment, confusing the roles of prosecution and
judgment. Pradel, supra note 75, at 204.
99
As to France, see Saas, supra note 82, at 827. Even police suspend proceedings in minor
traffic cases and impose sanctions. Id., at 829.
100
GE (p. 31).
101
GE (p. 31); NE (pp. 16-17, for this reason NE is moving towards replacing diversion with
penal orders).
102
SC (p. 22).
103
15-20% of all cases in the last 20 years, GE (p. 30); 7-11% of all dismissals from 1995-2002
in DE (p. 25); used 219 times in 2001 in NO (p. 8); in CR (p. 15), the procedure was seldom
used in relation to adults, but resulted in anywhere from 59% (young adults from 18-21 years
of age) to 87% (juveniles from 15-18 years of age) of all dismissals. In Scotland, informal
diversion was used in 3.1% of cases in 2002-03, 3.9% in 2004-2005, and “fiscal fines,” another
type of diversion, were used in 7.9% of cases in 2002-03, 9.3% in 2003-04, SC (p. 4). On the
other hand, the procedure is seldom used in CR (p. 16) or France, where only .17% of cases
were resolved by diversion in 2001. Langer, supra note 13, at 61.
104
The procedure exists since 1930 in IT (p. 14), but only in 1999 were provisions made to
assess the costs of the procedure to the defendant. It was introduced in NO (p. 9), in 1991, in
1994 in GE (p. 32), but procedural mechanisms to implement it were not introduced until 1999
which seek to encourage victim-offender mediation in as many cases as possible, GE (p. 35); in
DE (p. 27) in 1995 experimentally in three jurisdictions; in BR (pp. 1, 4-6) in 1995. In SC (p.
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in ancient customary law where the families or clans of victims and victimizers
would arrange for a composition, wergeld or some kind of compensation,
often accompanied by feasts or other rituals of conciliation.105
Today the procedure is often obligatory as a first step in cases brought
by private complaint and private prosecution, usually misdemeanor offenses
such as battery, infliction of minor injuries, defamation, vandalism, etc.106
The procedure is popular in many of the former Soviet republics,107 where
some codes even articulate the “right” of the defendant to conciliate with
the victim.108 Only if the case cannot be settled through conciliation will the
criminal procedure continue along the normal path. The result is a dismissal
once conciliation has been achieved.109 Since many of these minor crimes
may be subject to diversion proceedings there may be an intertwining of
these procedures.110 It has been limited to minor offenses,111 generally, due
to the possibility that influential or perhaps dangerous defendants could
coerce conciliation for robberies or rapes, etc., and thus avoid criminal
responsibility.112 Some voices in the literature, a distinct minority, maintain
that the procedure might violate equal protection if not applied to crimes
where society is the victim.113

14), charity-administered conciliation programs were introduced on an experimental basis in
Aberdeen, Edinburgh and Lanarkshire in 1988.
105
Damaska, supra note 4, at 1020, believes the early medieval legal process constituted “the
common stem of Western procedural culture” and a “vehicle for the settlement of disputes and
the prevention of endemic violence.”
106
GE (p. 15); NE (p. 27); CR (p. 16); NO (p. 8); BU (pp. 5-6, 10); PO (pp. 3-4, 19); IT (p. 13,
entire system of peace courts is aimed at promoting conciliation). In Nicaragua, “mediation”
towards the end of conciliation and restitution is possible in cases of misdemeanors, negligent
or unintentional crimes, property crimes among family members involving violence or
intimidation, and crimes punishable with minor punishments, NI (§56 CCP). In Paraguay,
conciliation is obligatory in cases subject to private prosecution, and discretionary in others.
PAR (§§311, 424 CCP). In UZ (§84(para.5)(2)), the procedure is limited to first-offenders who
do not represent “great social danger” or perpetrators of less serious crimes who have made
restitution, showed active remorse, or helped solve the crime.
107
It was included in the Soviet era Russian RSFSR (§5(6) CCP) relating to cases initiated by
complaint of the victim and was further included in the MPCCIS (§36(1)(6)) and in AR (§36
CCP); BE (§§26(2), 29(1)(5), 30(1)(2) CCP); LA (§§536-38 CCP); LI (§§207, 420 CCP); TA
(§§5(para.1)(3), 5.3 CCP); UZ (§§582-86 CCP).
108
LA (§66(1)(17) CCP).
109
UZ (§84(para.4) CCP); TU (§31(1)(6) CCP-Draft).
110
GE (pp. 17, 36-38); in Nicaragua, “mediation” leads to a suspension of the case pending
restitution and other conditions, much as is the case with diversion, NI (§57(4) CCP).
111
In Russia it may be applied to crimes of slight or mid-level gravity. RU (§25 CCP) in the
MPCCIS (§37(1)) to misdemeanors.
112
This has been a problem in Venezuela, but not recognized as a problem in CR (p. 17), NO (p.
9), BR (p. 6), SC (p. 14), or IT (p. 13), though in the latter it could not be excluded.
113
GE (pp. 32-33, such as the offenses of complete intoxication, tax fraud, etc.).
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Victim-Offender conciliation requires active participation of both parties
and should not be confused with procedures which, upon the payment of
restitution, may result in dismissal, without there necessarily being a face-toface interaction.114 Thus, a type of bargaining is compelled at times in these
cases,115 in fact is part and parcel of the conciliation process, in determining
the plausibility of conciliation and the terms which will ensure its success.116
Bargaining as to restitution even in cases without a private victim, such as
tax cases, is a commonplace as well.117 In some countries, neutral mediators
are used118 and the public prosecutor is not involved.119 In others the public
prosecutor120 or the court are involved.121 In Russia, it has been held that the
court must entertain a motion to dismiss on the part of the aggrieved party
where complete restitution has been made and the defendant has little or no
criminal record and has expressed remorse.122
As with diversion and penal orders, some voices find that victim-offender
conciliation provisions, when they are conditioned on the defendant admitting
guilt,123 violate the privilege against self-incrimination by compelling this
admission.124 The frequency of use of victim-offender mediation varies from
country to country.125
114

BR (p. 5); GE (p. 32). Provisions allowing dismissal or mitigation to be triggered by
restitution may be applicable to more serious offenses, like sexual offenses, whereas victimoffender conciliation would not, GE (p. 34).
115
GE (p. 36).
116
In CR (p. 16), where conciliation not regulated, bargaining is well possible; in BR (p. 6), IT
(p. 13), there is bargaining as to the amount of restitution.
117
In GE (pp. 35-37), it has been questioned whether restitution should suffice to trigger a
dismissal in cases involving the rich because no “considerable personal efforts.” or “personal
sacrifice” is involved. Some voices claim that such defendants should also make a large
symbolic payment to the state coffers.
118
PO (pp. 4, 18, requires parties select a person or institution in whom they have confidence); DE
(p. 28); in Nicaragua, “mediation” may be conducted before a lawyer, notary, public defender or
a rural “facilitator of justice,” NI (§57 (para.1) CCP). The Paraguayan code mentions the use of
an amigable componedor (“friendly compromiser”), PAR (§424 CCP). For the use of mediators
in the probation office, see LA (§381 CCP).
119
DE (p. 28).
120
In NE (p. 19), while there is no official victim-offender conciliation, a procedure was
experimentally introduced in 1995 allowing the victim to approach the public prosecutor before
joining trial as an aggrieved party with a claim to compensation and to attempt, with help of the
prosecutorial staff, to come to an agreement with the offender about compensation. Principle
of opportunity then allows prosecutor to base decision on whether or not to prosecute on the
outcome.
121
BU (p. 10).
122
Opredelenie Sudebnoy kollegii po ugolovnym delam Verkhovnogo Suda RF, May 24, 2005,
No. 57-D05-9 http://www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id=4365.
123
GE (p. 35, requires a confession in cases involving violence and sexual assault); DE (p. 28);
PO (p. 18); NO (p. 8, guilt must have been proved for the procedure to be used).
124
GE (pp. 34-35).
125
It was little used in the early years in GE, but this is beginning to change GE (p. 37), and has
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3. Consensual Procedures Resulting in a Skipping of the
Preliminary Investigation and the Trial
3.1. Penal Orders
The penal order, which appears to have originated in Germany,126 consists
in the public prosecutor, in cases in which only a fine127or lesser periods of
deprivation of liberty128 is contemplated, submitting in writing a suggested
charge and punishment to the defendant, who is given a short period of time
to accept or reject the proposal.129 If the defendant rejects the proposal, the
case will be tried according to the normal procedures.130 In many countries,
the defendant’s silence or failure to respond will constitute acceptance of the
also been used only 8,000 times in PO (p. 19) in the first eight years of its existence, 60% of
cases actually resulting in conciliation; in DE (p. 27), conciliation was requested in 1432 cases,
357 were referred to a mediator, and 150 were successfully mediated; in NO (p. 9) it was used
only 20 times in 2004. In BR (p. 9) victim-offender conciliation has unburdened the courts to
a certain extent, but has been seen as being relatively ineffective. In 2004-05 in SC (p. 14),
victim-offender conciliation was undertaken in 1,232 cases and was successful in 91% of cases
in which both victim and defendant.
126
The institution goes back to 1877 and is based on a previous Prussian model, GE (p. 28).
127
GE (pp. 22-23, cases punishable by fines or suspended periods of imprisonment of up to one
year); DE (pp. 19, 24, fines only); LI (§425(1) CCP) (fine only); NE (p. 17, if the fine exceeds
2000 Euros, the prosecutor must hear the defendant, but fines not surpassing 225 Euros, and
suspensions of a driver’s license for up to six months may be ordered without a hearing); IT
(p. 10, crimes punishable by a fine or up to 6 months suspended imprisonment); the offense
itself may be punishable by deprivation of liberty, NE (p. 17, of up to six years); CR (p. 11, of
up to five years) as long as only a fine is sought in relation to the defendant in question (NO,
p. 7, applicable to burglary and theft in such circumstances); BR (pp. 4-5), misdemeanors or
offenses punishable by less than two years); SC (pp. 12-13, “fixed penalties” of up to 60 pounds
for normal traffic offenses, and 200 pounds for driving without insurance may be issued by
the public prosecutor or the police). See also ES (§251(1) CCP); LI (§425(1) CCP); CH (§392
CCP) (procedimiento monitorio), C. Riego, El procedimiento abreviado en Chile, in Maier &
Bovino, supra note 38, at 472. The French “simplified procedure,” which results in a penal
order (ordonnance pénale) is applicable to minor crimes (délits) and infractions (contraventions)
where no imprisonment is possible, FR (§§495, 459-1, 524 CCP).
128
In PO (p. 16), “conviction without trial” may apply to offenses punishable by up to 10
years.
129
Seven days in LI (§§427, 429 CCP); Eight days in CR (p. 11); three to ten days in NO (p. 7);
10 days in ES (§254(6) CCP); two weeks in GE (p. 24), NE (p. 17), 15 days in IT (p. 10) and
immediately upon oral offer at the preliminary hearing in BR (p. 5); up to 28 days, however,
with regard to Scottish “fixed penalties.” SC (p. 12); 15 days per CH (§392(c) CCP), Riego,
supra note 127, at 472. The defendant in cases of French “simplified procedure,” however, has
45 days to accept the penal order, in cases of délits, FR (495-3 CCP), and 30 days in cases of
contraventions, FR (§527 CCP).
130
DE (pp. 12, 24).
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penal order.131 The judge in most countries, however, maintains the power to
reject the penal order if he/she believes it is unsupported by the evidence.132
Sometimes the victim also may block a penal order.133 Sometimes, the penal
order is restricted to cases where the defendant has confessed or where
the state of the evidence clearly shows guilt, as would be the case with
flagrant offenses.134 Penal orders result, at times, in a statutorily discounted
punishment.135 Although not provided for in the code, it has been recognized
that bargaining between defense and prosecution at the early stages of the
procedure exists,136 or cannot be excluded as a possibility137 so that a penal
order will be satisfactory to the defense. While the court pronounces judgment
tantamount to a guilt-finding in many countries,138 it is of a skeletal variety
due to the lack of a formal investigation of the evidence.139 In some countries,
however, the finding is less one of guilt, than a kind of Verdachtsstrafe, i.e., a
mere finding of probable cause.140
Penal orders have greatly reduced the caseload of the courts in some
countries,141 yet continue to arouse criticism due to the fact that the defendant
usually has no right to be heard142 and that it is essentially the prosecutor
131

FR (§527(para.4) CCP).
GE (pp. 23-24, if no “probable cause” or disagrees with the punishment proposed, in which
cases proceeds by the expedited procedure); CR (p. 11); ES (§253(3) CCP); the judge has no
power to reject the penal order, however, in: NO (p. 7); LI (§427 CCP).
133
IT (p. 10); FR (§§524(para.3), 528-2(para.3) CCP, if victim has filed a complaint against the
defendant).
134
GE (p. 23); DE (pp. 19, 24, often applicable to petty thefts, minor drug offenses, traffic
cases). See also the CCP-Neuquen (Argentina) where the preliminary investigation may be
eliminated in flagrant cases. G. Vitale, El proceso penal abreviado con especial referencia a
Neuquén, in Maier & Bovino, supra note 38, at 366.
135
Up to 1/2 of what would have been the appropriate fine, IT (p. 10).
136
GE (p. 26). For instance, the prosecutor may suggest a particular level of fine to the defendant
if the defendant agrees not to object to the penal order. M. D. Dubber, American Plea Bargains,
German Lay Judges, and the Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 Stanford L. Rev. 547, 560
(1997).
137
DE (p. 24); NE (p. 19, no reason to believe prosecutor won’t bargain with powerful
defendants); NO (p. 7); IT (pp. 10-11).
138
In IT (p. 11); GE (p. 26); SC (pp. 12-13), the decree is equal to a judgment and may not be
appealed.
139
In CR (pp. 11, 21), it is based on the police report and the court’s satisfaction that the fine or
measure is correctly imposed.
140
Some voices in Germany belief the finding is really only one of probable cause, GE (p. 26);
BR (p. 5), treats the result as a mere imposition of punishment without a guilt-finding.
141
Penal orders constitute 2/3 of all convictions in GE (p. 26). In the mid 1990’s, around 22% of
penal orders were rejected by defendants. Dubber, supra note 136, at 562. 28% of all cases in
Croatia are resolved by penal orders, CR (p. 12); in 2001 NO (p. 7) decided 215,276 cases by
penal order. On the other hand, “fixed penalty” cases amount to only 2-3% of all cases in SC (p.
13). Few defendants reject the penal order in France. Pradel, supra note 75, at 683.
142
Thus violating right of due process of Arts. 14(1)(1) IPCPR, 6(1)(1) ECHR and 103 Const.
Ger. GE (p. 27).
132

PLEA-BARGAINING, NEGOTIATING CONFESSIONS & CONSENSUAL RESOLUTION OF CRIMINAL CASES971

that imposes judgment143 without trial144 and with minimal or no judicial
control and no express finding of guilt.145 Fears have been expressed that
a defendant, who might not be represented by counsel, will agree without
sufficient knowledge of the circumstances.146 Concerns of equal protection
due to differences in the treatment of like offenses in different judicial districts
have also been voiced.147 Concerns of procedural economy, however, have
also led to praise of the penal order due to its unburdening of the courts and
the fact the defendant has a right to reject the offer.148 Despite its 100 year plus
vintage, many countries are only recently turning to the penal order in pursuit
of procedural economy.149

3.2. Guilty Pleas and Stipulations to the Charges as Substitutes for the
Criminal Trial
3.2.1. Introduction: the Common Law Guilty Plea and its Development in
the US
It is unclear when in the Anglo-American Common Law a guilty plea by a
defendant led inexorably to the waiver of the right to have a jury decide the
issue of guilt or innocence.150 The procedure likely had its roots in the 19th
Century but, once it was accepted that a guilty plea could lead directly to
sentence, the procedure gradually began to replace the full-blown trial by
jury.151 By the beginning of the 20th Century, 50% of all cases were settled by
guilty pleas in the US, the percentage rising to 80% in the 1960’s and reaching
93-95% today.152 While guilty pleas were accepted in the 19th Century as a trialending procedural figure, it was only in the mid-20th Century that it began to
143

Thus violating the separation of powers, DE (p. 24); NE (pp. 18-19); PO (p. 16).
GE (p. 27).
145
GE (pp. 27-28, due to overburdening of courts).
146
NE (p. 19).
147
DE (p. 25).
148
DE (p. 24); CR (pp. 12, 22); NO (p. 7); IT (p. 11).
149
NE (p. 17), has only introduced it in 2006 in order to be able to more expeditiously exact fines
where terms of diversion have been violated; IT (p. 22) introduced the penal order with its 1988
Code of Criminal Procedure and CR (p. 12) in 1998.
150
When trials in England were fast and one jury could handle several in one day, trial judges
discouraged defendants from pleading guilty and encouraged them to take their chance with the
jury. J. H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial 19 (2003). Guilty pleas were also
discouraged in late 18th Century America, and one trial court, as late as the 1890’s could still
handle as many as six trials a day. A. W. Alschuler & A. G. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal
Jury in the United States, 6l U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 922-25 (1994).
151
In SC (p. 15) there is no further taking of evidence after a guilty plea and the proceedings
immediately move to the sentencing stage.
152
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 150, at 922-24.
144
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be recognized that guilty pleas were often preceded by full-fledged bargaining
by prosecutor, defendant, and sometimes the judge over the type of charge the
defendant would admit to and the parameters of the resultant punishment. The
US Supreme Court finally recognized the fact of such bargaining and even
put its stamp of approval on it, claiming it did not violate any of the important
principles of criminal procedure as long as the defendant made a knowing and
voluntary plea and properly waived his right to remain silent, to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses, and his right to a trial by jury. The “knowledge”
requirement was held to mean that he must know the character of the charges
and that he must know the consequences of his plea as well, i.e., the range of
possible punishment, and sometimes even collateral measures that might be
applied upon the finding of guilt.153
Eventually, plea-bargaining and guilty pleas were regulated by sometimes
detailed statutes154 which cover the procedure for obtaining pleas, the rights of
the defendant, such as the right to counsel, which must be abided by, as well
as the types of rights a defendant can be induced to waive upon entering into a
“plea agreement,” as the resulting contract has been named in the US federal
system. All terms must be put on the record now in most US jurisdictions.155
What is common in all US jurisdictions, is that plea-bargaining applies
to any and all kinds of cases, from minor infractions, up to capital murder
cases. This differentiates American plea-bargaining from most other systems
which have been adopted in other countries. Another important factor, is
that the large differences between minimum and maximum punishments in
most US jurisdictions means that the “offer” of the public prosecutor may
appear to some to be inherently coercive.156 The US Supreme Court has ruled
that it does not, for instance, violate due process for a prosecutor to offer
a defendant to either admit guilt and suffer a five year sentence, or insist
on a jury trial, where, if he is convicted, the public prosecutor will ask for
life imprisonment.157 Critics have claimed that only with a reduction in the
Draconian length of prison sentences will plea-bargaining’s hold on criminal
procedure be loosened.158
153

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 US 238, 242-44 (l969); United States v. Brady, 397 US 742, 751-52
(1970); Santobello v. New York, 404 US 257, 261 (1971).
154
Informal guilty plea practice became codified in SA (p. 6), only in 2001.
155
US (p. 2). The same holds true in SA (p. 7). The main federal statute is Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
156
Many critics point to the huge differences between punishments in America and Europe to
stress this aspect of American plea bargaining. Damaska, supra note 4, at 1027. Hans Zeisel
once surmised that each month of a European sentence would translate into a year’s deprivation
of liberty in the US. Langbein, supra note 51, at 16. Dubber, supra note 136, at 596-97, has
noted that, while all defendants convicted of felonies in the US federal courts receive prison
sentences (40% of which were suspended as a condition of probation), no federal felon received
a fine as the primary sentence, whereas in Germany 80% of all punishments are fines, and only
5% are sentenced to deprivation of liberty.
157
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 US 357 (l978).
158
Dubber, supra note 136, at 553, 597.
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3.2.2. The Gradual but Reluctant Acceptance of Guilty-Plea Mechanisms in
Civil Law Jurisdictions
Historically in the countries of the civil law, a defendant could not herself
dispose of the charges by admitting guilt, thus preventing further taking of
evidence and the conduct of a trial, whether it be before jury, mixed court or a
panel of judges or a single magistrate. This violated the right to due process,
the requirement that justice could only be meted out by a judge, and many
important principles of continental European criminal procedure. This view
still holds in many countries.159
Nevertheless, already in 19th Century Spain, a defendant was allowed to
terminate the taking of evidence and cause the trial to move to the imposition
of punishment by expressing his conformity, or conformidad to the pleadings
of the prosecution parties.160 This tradition has continued in an uninterrupted
fashion up to this day and has served as a model for some Latin American
countries in the development of guilty-plea mechanisms.161
Otherwise, the first apparent break in the complete rejection of guilty plea
mechanisms came with the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure of 1988 with the
introduction of the “application for punishment upon request of the parties,”
commonly called the patteggiamento, or “deal” which originally provided for
up to a 1/3 discount on punishment and was limited to crimes punishable
by no more than three years deprivation of liberty. The patteggiamento has
become one of the main models for guilty plea mechanisms which have
been introduced in Europe,162 the former Soviet Republics163 and some Latin
American countries.
159

GE (p. 38); DE (p. 17); NO (p. 9).
Since the enactment of the CCP of 1882, SP (p. 2). See N. Rodríguez García, El Consenso en
el Proceso Penal Espanol 78 (1997), who claims the procedure was already introduced as early
as 1848.
161
The Spanish conformidad was the model for the juicio abreviado provided for in §431 bis
of the Argentine Federal CPP, A. Bovino, Procedimiento abreviado y juicio por jurados, in
Maier & Bovino, supra note 38, at 65-66. It was introduced in 1997 in the Federal Argentine
CCP, Córdoba, supra note 38, at 229. It was introduced in 1994 in the CCP of the Province of
Tierra del Fuego and called the omisión del debate (omission of the trial). E. C. Sarrabayrouse,
La omisión del debate en el Código Procesal Penal de Tierra del Fuego. Su régimen legal y
aplicación práctica, in Maier & Bovino, supra note 38, at 300-02. It is also clearly the model
for many of the “abbreviated procedures” introduced in other parts of Latin America: the
procedimientos abreviados in the 1999 CCP of Bolivia, BO (§373 CCP); the 2000 CCP of
Chile, CH (§406 CCP). Among the successor states of the Soviet Union, the possibility of
entering a “guilty plea” was broached in §35 of the Model Code of Criminal Procedure for the
Commonwealth of Independent States (MCCIS).
162
Consensual procedures similar to the Italian model have been introduced in: SA (p. 8) in
2000; in BU (p. 12) in 2000, with significant changes made in 2005; in CR (p. 22) in 2002.
163
This rapporteur drafted a chapter on consensual procedures for the authors of the 2001
Russian Code of Criminal Procedure and the legislator adopted a procedure I suggested which
160
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Finally, a more wide-open negotiation of guilty pleas has been adopted in
some countries based on the classic American model and often as the result of
American influence in the legislative process in those countries.164
3.2.3. Theories for Accepting “Bargaining” With Justice
In the US, plea-bargaining has been justified on the theory that it is a “contract”
between two equal bargaining entities that must be upheld. If the prosecutor
reneges on the offer, the defendant can withdraw his plea or plead for specific
enforcement of the terms.165 If the defendant breaches, he may be prosecuted
on the dismissed charges, held to his guilty plea, and be sentenced to a more
aggravated punishment.166 Easterbrook invokes models of contract law, and
characterizes plea bargaining as a “voluntary transaction which maximizes
the welfare of both parties.” The defendant is spared of anxiety and the costs
of litigation and the prosecutor frees up resources to pursue other criminals.
He argues against judicial oversight for “if a third party must approve the
settlement, settlements and their savings become less frequent.167
It is seen to be an outgrowth of the adversarial system of justice168 where
the search for truth is not an explicit goal of the proceedings169 and trial judges
have no prior knowledge of the facts of the case to guide any search for truth
due to the absence of an investigative file.170

was very similar to the Italian patteggiamento. See Rekomendatsii parlamentskikh slushaniy
“O khode podgotovki proekta Ugolovno-protsessual’nogo kodeksa Rossiyskoy Federatsii”
(po problemam, kasaiushchikhsia sokrashchennykh predvaritel’nykh slushaniy i form
sudoproizvodstva). 16 January 2001 (copy on file with author).
164
See the procedures for Nicaragua and Venezuela, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and
Georgia, addressed infra.
165
Santobello v. New York, 404 US 257, 261 (1971). The government may be in breach of the
contract if it breaks its promise not to oppose the defendant’s request for a certain punishment
by attempting to prove aggravating circumstances, United States v. Taylor, 77 F3d 368 (11th Cir.
1996), or, for instance, by submitting a victim impact statement, United States v. Johnson, 187
F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 1999), US (p. 5). For a position in support of the contract theory, see F. H.
Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 Yale L. J. 1969, 1975 (1992).
166
United States v. Holbrook, 368 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Cimino, 381 F.3d
124 (2d Cir. 2004), US (p. 5).
167
US (p. 7).
168
Langer, supra note 13, at 6, sees plea bargaining as a ‘text’ that has been translated from one
‘language’ – the adversarial system of the United States, into another, that of the inquisitorial
systems of Germany, Italy, Argentina, and France.
169
“The adversarial conception of truth is more relative and consensual: if the parties come to an
agreement as to the facts of the case, through plea agreements or stipulations, it is less important
to determine how events actually occurred.” Langer, supra note 13, at 10.
170
US (p. 1).
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3.2.4. The Scope of the Application of Guilty Plea Mechanisms
A guilty plea may be accepted in relation to any charge, even the most serious,
in the US and will serve to terminate evidence-taking and move the case
immediately to the sentencing stage and the imposition of punishment.171 This
model has been followed in some countries.172
The consensual procedures in the civil law realm have typically not been
applicable to prosecutions for serious or especially grave offenses.173 The
Spanish conformidad is applicable, in its usual form, to crimes punishable
by no more than six years deprivation of liberty.174 In some Latin American
171

This should be distinguished from countries where the defendant may admit guilt, thus
shortening the trial, or even providing for a trial before a professional bench, rather than a bench
with lay participation, NO (pp. 4, 9).
172
In SC (p. 15) and apparently in SA (p. 6). It also appears there is no restriction in the BO (§373
CCP). In Costa Rica, a conformidad-type acceptance of the charge with a substantial reduction
in punishment potentially applies to all charges. J. Llobet Rodríguez, Procedimiento abreviado
en Costa Rica, presunción de inocencia y derecho de abstención de declarar, in Maier &
Bovino, supra note 38, at 446. In Honduras, the “abbreviated procedure” applies to all crimes,
as long as the accused has no prior criminal record. HO (§403 CCP). The Nicaraguan acuerdo
(agreement) appears to be very close to the US plea bargain, as it allows free negotiation of the
charges in all types of cases, NI (§61(para.1) CCP). In Venezuela, the “procedure for admitting
the facts” is applicable to all cases, though the discount one receives differs depending on the
seriousness of the offense, see infra, VE (§376 CCP). There appear to be no limits to the pleabargaining introduced in 2004 in Georgia and in the Latvian “agreements” in §§539-43 of the
2005 CCP.
173
Only misdemeanors in PO (p. 16); they may not apply to first degree offenses punishable
by a minimum of 4 years or maximum of life imprisonment in Estonia. §239 CCP-Estonia.
The Moldovan guilty plea may be accepted in relation to crimes of slight, mid-level or serious
character. MO (§504(2) CCP). This appears to exclude “especially serious” crimes.
174
SP (p. 1). The same six year limit exists in the juicio abreviado in Argentina’s federal CCP,
Bovino, supra, note 161, at 65. In a 2002 Spanish law which introduced “expedited trials,”
however, a defendant may express his/her conformidad in any case where the public prosecutor
is requesting a sentence of ten years or less, although the amount of actual prison time is
limited to two years in such cases, SP (p. 8); conformidad is also applicable in juvenile cases,
where usually only measures short of deprivation of liberty are imposed, SP (p. 12). Despite
these statutory limitations, it seems as if Spanish courts will accept “guilty pleas” to more
serious crimes and move directly to sentence, as was recently done in the case of the “rapist of
Pozuelo” in the Madrid Provincial Court where a Brazilian “pled guilty” and accepted a 300
year sentence (he will only serve 20 years thereof). El ‘violador de Pozuelo’ acepta una pena
de más de 300 anos de prisión por atacar a 19 mujeres, El País, June 6, 2006, at 40. Similar
procedures in Cuba are applicable to crimes punishable by up to seven years, C. Loarca & M.
Bertelotti, El procedimiento abreviado en Guatemala, in Maier & Bovino, supra note 38, at
413. The conformidad-type procedures in the CCP of Buenos Aires, however, applies to crimes
punishable by up to eight years, and that of the CCP of the Province of Córdoba in Argentina
applies to all crimes. Córdoba, supra note 38, at 249. The Model CCP for Ibero-America
originally called for limiting such procedures to crimes punishable by no more than two years,
Id., and the CCP-Tierra del Fuego permits them for crimes punishable by a maximum of three
years. Sarrabayrouse, supra note 161, at 302.
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jurisdictions, the parties may agree to a disposition as to the facts and the
sentence in minor cases and the judge may not sentence in excess of the
agreed-upon limit.175
Although the Italian patteggiamento was originally limited to crimes
punishable by no more than three years, the legislator extended its scope in
2003 to crimes punishable by up to five year.176 This tendency to expand the
applicability of the consensual procedures in civil law jurisdictions is notable
also in Russia, where the provision, modeled on the Italian patteggiamento,
was applicable to crimes punishable by no more than three years upon first
reading in the State Duma, but was raised to five years upon passage of the
new Code of Criminal Procedure in 2001, and up to ten years177 in a 2003
amendment to the code.178
3.2.5. Statutory Discounts or Free Bargaining Between Prosecution &
Defense
Statutory discounts for defendants who admit guilt are virtually unknown in
the US.179 and other common law countries. Naturally there must be some
incentive to plead guilty and waive the right to a jury trial or trial by professional
or lay magistrates and a guilty plea is usually considered to be a mitigating
factor which will lead to a lesser sentence than if one were to be convicted at
a jury trial. It is generally accepted that English magistrates and crown courts
will grant around a 1/3 discount to anyone who enters a timely guilty plea,
175

In §§503-04 CCP-Neuquen (Argentina), the limit is two years and the judge in his or her
judgment must accept the facts as agreed upon by the parties. Vitale, supra note 134, at 367.
The Chilean “abbreviated procedure” applies, conformidad-like, if the public and private
prosecutors in their accusatory pleadings request a punishment of deprivation of liberty which
does not exceed five years, even though the maximum punishment for the crime could be higher.
Riego, supra note 127, at 457-58.
176
IT (p. 15). The French reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité (preliminary recognition of
guilt) is also applicable to crimes punishable by no more than five years deprivation of liberty,
FR (§495-7 CCP). The Paraguayan “abbreviated procedure” also apparently only applies to
crimes punishable by up to five years imprisonment. Loarca & Bertelotti, supra note 174, at
413; cf. PAR (§420(1) CCP).
177
10 years is the maximum also in CR (pp. 17, 19).
178
RU (§314 CCP). The Guatemalan “abbreviated procedure” was originally applicable to
crimes punishable by a maximum of two years, but has now been extended to those punishable
by no more than five years. §464 CCP-Guatemala, as amended in 1997, Loarca & Bertelotti,
supra note 174, at 413-414.
179
Often in the US there is a huge differential between the likely sentence after a jury verdict,
and that offered by the public prosecutor. For instance, in the case of Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 US 357 (1978), five years in the event of a plea and life imprisonment after jury verdict, US
(pp. 2-3). In earlier days, a guilty plea could statutorily spare a defendant of the death penalty,
which could only be imposed by a jury. Such provisions were held to be coercive of guilty pleas
in United States v. Jackson, 390 US 570 (l968).
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though this is nowhere codified and is not binding.180 Although there is no
codified discount in Scotland, the High Court has ruled that the discount must
be at least 1/3 upon a timely entry of a guilty plea.181 Nonetheless, the codes
seldom provide for mandatory mitigation in the event of a guilty plea in the
sentencing statutes like is often the case in civil law countries.182
There were no statutory discounts applicable in the traditional Spanish
conformidad,183 but, with the introduction of the Italian patteggiamento,
many civil law countries have enacted statutory minimal discounts which
the sentencing judge must grant if the defendant chooses to terminate the
proceedings with a guilty plea, “request for punishment,” or expression
of conformity to the charges.184 The typical discount is one-third of the
punishment which the judge would have otherwise imposed, taking into
consideration gravity of offense, and personal characteristics of the offender.185
In Croatia, however, the sentence to be imposed may not exceed one-third of
the maximum sentence, resulting in a 2/3 discount.186 In Costa Rica, when the
defendant accepts the maximum charges presented by the prosecuting parties
(including the aggrieved party) in a conformidad-like procedure, he or she
180

For an estimate that the discount is from 25-30%, see Viscount Runciman of Doxford (Ed.),
The Royal Commision on Criminal Justice, Report §41 (1993).
181
De Plooy v. HM Advocate, 2005 1 JC 1, SC (p. 15); an investigations of the authors has
shown, however, that some judges started from a higher maximum so as to avoid the necessity
of a real 1/3 discount. Due to the vast judicial sentencing discretion in Scotland it is impossible
to know whether the defendant actually gets a 1/3 discount. Id. p. 16.
182
A confession or admission of guilt will substantially mitigate in DE (p. 30), and usually to the
extent of 1/3 in NO (pp. 3, 9). In SC (p. 15), a statute requires mitigation for a timely entered
guilty plea.
183
The defendant would accept the correctness of the highest qualification of the charges and
the highest requested sentence of the public prosecutor and private and popular prosecutors if
they exist as long as the latter was six years or less and the judge had to sentence below the
requested punishment. There are also no statutory discounts in SA (p. 6), in Latvia and in BU
(p. 15), where this absence has been criticized.
184
The name of the Russian procedure is “agreement with the filed charges.” RU (§314 CCP).
185
IT (p. 15); the 1/3 discount has been introduced in SP (pp. 6-7), in the “expedited trial”
legislation of 2002, though the sentence of deprivation of liberty may not exceed two years; the
French réconnaissance de la culpabilité, introduced in 2003, also grants a 1/3 statutory discount.
In Colombia, §37 CCP allows a defendant to get a 1/3 discount on an “anticipated judgment”
(sentencia anticipada) if she agrees to the charges before the preliminary investigation is
complete; the discount falls to 1/6 if she makes this decision after the case is charged and
before trial. O. J. Guerrero Perralta, Colombia, in J. B. J. Maier et al. (Eds.), Las Reformas
Procesales Penales en América Latina 234 (2000). In Lithuania, if a defendant subject to
expedited proceedings agrees to admit guilt, the court may not sentence to more than 2/3 of
the maximum punishment and may sentence 1/3 less than the minimum required sentence. LI
(§440(1) CCP).
186
CR (p. 19). In Venezuela, the general discount in cases of admisión de los hechos is from
1/3 to 1/2 of the sentence which would otherwise be imposed. However, by crimes of violence
with a maximum punishment which exceeds 8 years, the discount is limited to 1/3, VE (§376
CCP).
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may not be sentenced to more than 1/3 of the statutory minimum required for
the offense.187 The “abbreviated procedure” introduced in El Salvador in 1998
reforms applies to cases punishable by no more than three years deprivation of
liberty, and the criminal code in such cases requires a sentence not including
deprivation of liberty in cases where the punishment would have been from
six months to one year, and allows the judge to suspend jail sentences in
cases punishable from one to three years.188 A one-fourth discount is given
according to the Honduran “abbreviated procedure.”189 Although the French
“recognition of guilt” applies only to cases punishable by five or less years of
imprisonment, if a prison sentence is imposed it may not exceed six months
and fines may not exceed half of what they would normally have been.190
In the Estonian “settlement proceedings” the prosecutor, defendant and
victim enter into a settlement agreement after free negotiations which then
must be accepted by the judge in its entirety, or rejected, whereupon the case
must be tried according to the normal procedures.191 In Colombia, an audiencia
especial (special hearing) may be convoked at which prosecution and defense
may negotiate the elements of the charged crime and the level of defendant’s
participation, thus constituting explicit plea, if not sentence bargaining.192
In some of the recently enacted consensual procedures, specific language
links plea or sentence bargaining to what in the US are called “cooperation
agreements,” i.e., conditions attached to the “deal” that require the defendant
to aid in the prosecution of others by testifying, giving information, etc.193
Such provisions have been introduced in some Latin American194 and of the
187

§§373-375 CCP-Costa Rica, Llobet Rodríguez, supra note 172, at 434.
§§379-389, CCP-El Salvador, E. Amaya Cóbar, El procedimiento abreviade en el proceso
penal de El Salvador, in Maier & Bovino, supra note 38, at 402-403. Similarly, the “abbreviated
procedure” in Guatemala also allows for suspension of imposition of prison sentences up to
three years and commutation of sentences up to five years. Loarca & Bertelotti, supra note 174,
at 413.
189
HO (§404(para.4) CCP).
190
FR (§495-8 CCP).
191
ES (§248 CCP). The settlement includes agreement as to the charges, the punishment and the
amount, if any, of compensation or damages awarded to the aggrieved party or civil complainant.
ES (§245 CCP). The Nicaraguan “acuerdo” is also subject to unrestricted bargaining between
the parties, NI (§61(para.1) CCP).
192
As of 2000, however, the procedure was seldom used. Guerrero Peralta, supra note 185, at
235-36.
193
§5K1.1 US. Sentencing Guidelines provides for so-called “downward departures” for
cooperation with the federal authorities, which can implicate a sentence below the statutory
minimum per 18 U.S.C. §3553(e). The prosecutor has virtually complete control over whether
the “cooperation” of the defendant is sufficient. Wade v. United States, 504 US 181 (l992).
194
For instance, in NI (§62 CCP), where the testimony of a defendant must be truthful, or
“the agreement is broken in relation to the punishment imposed and the judge shall sentence
imposing the punishment which he deems adequate in relation to the acceptance of the acts by
the accused and the evidence presented.”
188
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former Soviet republics.195 In Latvia, the 2005 CCP recognizes a defense “right
to cooperate” with law enforcement officials as a basis for its cooperation
agreements196 which can lead to dismissal of charges in all but the most serious
cases, as long as the defendant has aided in solving a crime more serious than
the one he or she was charged with.197
In the US there are often no promises as to the extent of reduction of
sentence or whether charges will be dismissed until the defendant actually
“cooperates” and the prosecution has assessed the quality of such cooperation.
This model seems to have also been adopted in Moldova, where no actual
“plea-bargain” is entered into and a formal sentencing hearing is conducted
before the actual sentence is determined.198
3.2.6. Must the Defendant Admit Guilt?
The Anglo-American “guilty plea” obviously originally assumed the defendant
would admit the charges contained in the accusatory pleading, but over the
years judges have also allowed the defendant, in the US, to accept a pleabargain, or only enter a plea of nolo contendere,199 which essentially amounts to
an intent to “not contest” the charges, and do not require an explicit admission
195

Chapter LXIV of the Georgian Code of Criminal Procedure signed into law on February 13,
2004 introduces a “plea agreement” designed to substitute for the full criminal trial. (§679-1(1)
CCP). The “plea agreement” appears to be primarily introduced to effectuate co-operation of the
defendant in the prosecution of public corruption and other serious crimes. (§679-1(2) CCP).
In exchange, the prosecutor will ask for a reduced sentence or even, in the case of exceptional
aid in solving serious cases, be able to dismiss the prosecution. (§§679-1(5,9) CCP). If the
testimony or other co-operation proffered by the defendant is deemed to be unreliable or fail
to prove guilt of the crime against the third party, the plea agreement shall be null and void.
(§679-1(8) CCP). In LI (§210 CCP), the preliminary investigation may be suspended in cases
of suspects who help in the detection of the activities of a “criminal association” after the
suspect has confessed to such participation. However, if the suspect refuses to give evidence in
the case of a member of such association, the proceedings may be re-opened. In laying out the
procedure for plea-bargains in Moldova, the prosecutor should take into account “the desire of
the accused, defendant to aid in the realization of the criminal prosecution or accusation of other
persons.” MO (§505(1)(1) CCP).
196
The “right to cooperate” can be expressed in: (1) choosing a simpler type of procedure; (2)
influencing the conduct of the procedure; or (3) uncovering criminal acts committed by other
persons. LA (§§21, 66(1)(20) CCP). In Moldova, the defendant also has the “right” to admit the
charge and conclude an agreement to plead guilty, to agree to special procedures, to reconcile
with the victim. MO (§§64(2)(8,9,10,21) CCP).
197
LA (§410(1,2) CCP).
198
Although the “agreement to admit guilt” is called a “deal between the public prosecutor
and the accused … who gave his agreement to admit his guilt along with a shortening of the
punishment,” MO (§504(a) CCP) it appears that any recommendation of the prosecutor can be
rejected by the judge who determines the punishment after argument of the parties. MO (§§50809 CCP).
199
US (p. 2).
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of the facts underlying the accusatory pleading.200 Other judges may require
an admission of guilt or they will not accept the plea.201 Furthermore, some
US judges would even accept a “guilty plea” in cases where the defendant
actually denied guilt for the offense charged.202 This practice was upheld by
the US Supreme Court, as long as the judge made sure there was a factual
basis for a finding of guilt.203
The Spanish procedure of conformidad, somewhat like a US plea of nolo
contendere, does not require an explicit admission of guilt, but is tantamount to
an expression that the defendant has no objection, or expresses his agreement,
with the charges.204 The Italian applicazione della pena sulla richieste delle
parte (application of punishment upon request of the parties) also was just as
the title suggested: a request for punishment and not an admission of guilt.
Many of the procedures modeled after the Italian patteggiamento also do
not require any admission of guilt.205 On the other hand, an unconditional
admission of guilt is a prerequisite for the triggering of the guilty-plea-type
procedures in some countries.206
200

US (p. 4).
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f) allows each judge to decide whether they will require an admission of
guilt, US (p. 4).
202
This is only possible in SA (p. 6), when defendants plead guilty to fine-only offenses and
never actually go to court.
203
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 US 25 (1970), US (p. 4). Such pleas are not accepted in
England and Wales, R. Hatchard, Criminal Procedure in England and Wales, in R. Hatchard et
al., Comparative Criminal Procedure 20 (1996).
204
In other words, the defendant must admit that he is the accused who has been charged, SP (p.
2). Similarly in the Argentine federal CCP, he must agree that the act charged is true and that he
was the perpetrator, Bovino, supra note 161, at 66. Bovino sees this as being tantamount to a
confession. Córdoba, supra note 38, at 242. In CH (§406 CCP) it appears that the language of
the Spanish procedure has been adopted, not requiring an explicit acceptance of guilt, though
there is a dispute in the literature as to whether the conformidad is tantamount to a confession
of guilt. Riego, supra note 127, at 462. No admission of guilt is required in Costa Rica, Llobet
Rodríguez, supra note 172, at 440, or El Salvador, Amaya Cóbar, supra note 188, at 404.
205
CR (pp. 17, 19, but the defendant may not present evidence of innocence after requesting
punishment in order to try to achieve an acquittal, unless this evidence was newly discovered).
Although Estonian “settlement proceedings” are not patterned after the Italian patteggiamento
but more on American plea-bargaining, an explicit admission of guilt is now not required,
though an earlier procedure called “simplified proceedings,” introduced by amending the 1961
Soviet-era code, did require a confession. M. Sillaots, Admission and Confession of Guilt in
Settlement Proceedings under Estonian Criminal Procedure, IX Juridica International (Univ.
of Tartu, Estonia) (2004), at 117.
206
SA (p. 6); DE (p. 29); BU (p. 14); PO (pp. 16-17); BO (§373 CCP); HO (§403(2), (3)(a)
CCP); PAR (§420(2) CCP); VE (§376 CCP) (“admission of the facts”); FR (§495-7 CCP)
(“admit the acts”). See also §679-3(2) CCP-Georgia. It is one of the circumstances that must
be taken into consideration by the prosecutor upon agreeing to accept a plea in Moldova. MO
(§505(1)(4) CCP). If an “agreement” is concluded during the trial in Latvia, the defendant must
completely admit his guilt, LA (§544(2)(3) CCP).
201
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3.2.7. Procedural Aspects: Stage of Proceedings, Veto by Judge, Prosecutor,
or Aggrieved Party?
Procedural economy is maximized, of course, the earlier in the proceedings
the defendant agrees to resolve the case consensually without a trial. On
the other hand, without a minimum of investigative activity, there may be
insufficient evidence for a judge to be able to assure a factual foundation for
the judgment.207 In the US, guilty pleas may be entered anywhere from the
first appearance in court to the stage of jury deliberations after all evidence
has been taken and closing arguments of the parties have been made.208 In the
UK, on the other hand, there are efforts to try to prohibit, or at least lessen
the discount on punishment, for pleas made in the trial court, or after trial has
begun. In international criminal proceedings, a guilty plea may be proffered at
initial appearance, during pretrial proceedings, or during the trial.209
While the Spanish conformidad may be effectuated during the preliminary
investigation or at its termination,210 among the new European procedures,
many, beginning with the Italian patteggiamento, foresee that the procedure
will take place during the preliminary hearing before the giudice dell’udienza
preliminare211 after the preliminary investigation has been completed.212 The
procedures in Italy, as elsewhere, may also be implemented when the case is

207

This criticism has been levied against the Guatemalan “abbreviated procedure” which may
be triggered any time during the preliminary investigation, Loarca & Bertelotti, supra note 174,
at 424-25.
208
The same is true in SC (p. 15).
209
Knoops, supra note 6, at 259. For slightly different procedures depending on whether an
“agreement” is reached pretrial or at trial, see LA (§§539-45 CCP).
210
SP (p. 2); in CR (p. 19), requests for punishment may only be made up to and at the
completion of the preliminary investigation. In the Argentine federal CCP the juicio abreviado
may be triggered by the accused’s conformidad at any time up to the setting of trial. Córdoba,
supra note 38, at 231. In El Salvador, the “abbreviated procedure” must be commenced before
the preliminary hearing, Amaya Cóbar, supra note 188, at 403. In Honduras, the “abbreviated
procedure” must be initiated before the case is set for trial, HO (§403(1) CCP).
211
IT (p. 16); a preliminary hearing, presided over by the investigating magistrate, was introduced
in the 1995 Spanish Jury Law, and some courts, and the office of the public prosecutor, believe
that a conformidad in a jury case should be reached during the preliminary hearing, for then
there is no need to select a jury, there being no adversarial controversy, SP (pp. 9-10). In Costa
Rica, the motion for application of the procedimiento abreviado is made before the pretrial judge
during the preliminary hearing and sentencing is then before the trial judge. Llobet Rodríguez,
supra note 172, at 440.
212
The request for an conformidad-like “abbreviated trial” is also made after the conclusion
of the preliminary investigation in: BO (§373 CCP). The Chilean “abbreviated trial” may be
requested during the hearing to prepare the trial, CH (§406CCP).
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transferred to the trial court,213 or even at the beginning214 or at times during
the actual trial.215
Clearly in countries with different court compositions depending on the
seriousness of the charge, it is more likely that guilty pleas will be forthcoming
in the courts dealing with the lower and middle level offenses, rather than
the higher courts with lay participation, especially in Europe where they are
reserved for the most serious offenses.216
In some jurisdictions in the US, and in other countries as well, the judge
may veto a proposed consensual resolution of the case and set the case for
a full-blown trial.217 Where the judge may veto the procedure, however, the
judge’s act will always reveal a pre-evaluation of the evidence which should,
theoretically, make that judge biased to act as trier of fact at the trial.218
The prosecution or defense may appeal the judge’s veto to a higher court
213

In IT (p. 16), the procedure takes place in the trial court if the case is tried by a single judge;
also, if the procedure was rejected in Italy and the case proceeds through a normal trial, the
judge may nonetheless impose the reduced punishment at the conclusions despite the contrary
decision of the judge of the preliminary hearing.
214
Conformidad may also be accepted at the beginning of trials of both adults and minors, when
the defendant is questioned, SP (pp. 2, 13); see also, SA (p. 7).
215
In BU (p. 13), negotiations between public prosecutor and counsel at the time of indictment,
and the settlement may occur as late as during the trial. The fact that the Venezuelan “admission
of the facts” can take place during the trial has been criticized on grounds of procedural
economy. E. L. Pérez Sarmiento, Comentarios al Código Orgánico Procesal Penal 420 (3d ed.
2000).
216
Thus conformidades are not likely in Spanish jury courts for the most frequent crime subject
to its jurisdiction, homicide, but are used for a number of lesser crimes, like threats, setting of
forest fires, trespassing, or minor bribery cases, which are also subject to the court. Yet they are
very frequent in the professional courts which preside over Spanish “abbreviate procedure,” a
streamlined procedure which simplifies both preliminary investigation and trial and is designed
to be very accommodating to the institution of conformidad, SP (pp. 4, 9-10).
217
SA (p. 7). Since in SP (p. 5, 9), only the judge can exercise jurisdiction, she may not be a
passive participant during the conformidad procedure and may reject a proposed settlement if
the qualification of the charge seems inappropriate or if it appears the defendant did not freely or
knowingly proffer his conformity with the charges; the same is true in BU (p. 14), in addition, if
the court thinks that a plea agreement does not adequately consider the public and the victim’s
interests, or is “contrary to law or morals.” All Argentine procedures allow the judge to veto
the procedures. Sarrabayrouse, supra note 161, at 310. Cf. BO (§373); CH (§410 CCP). The
same is true in Guatemala, Loarca & Bertelotti, supra note 174, at 427, Georgia (§§679-3(2)(d),
679-4(4-6) CCP) and Latvia (§541(6) CCP). Either the judge of the preliminary hearing or the
trial judge may reject a conformidad in Costa Rica if they doubt its veracity. Llobet Rodríguez,
supra note 172, at 440. In ES (§248 CCP) the judge may either accept or reject the “settlement”
entered into by prosecution and defense, but may not alter it.
218
If the judge thinks the punishment is too lenient, then he/she would be biased against the
defendant and if he thinks an acquittal should be forthcoming, he is then biased against the
prosecution. Vitale, supra note 134, at 376-78. This is a possible problem in Guatemala, where
the code is unclear as to whether the same judge who rejects a consensual resolution will
ultimately try the case. Loarca & Bertelotti, supra note 174, at 429.
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in some countries.219 The aggrieved party (victim) has no procedural role
in most systems of consensual resolution of criminal cases,220 though their
position on the case may affect the decision of the public prosecutor.221 In
a minority of jurisdictions, however, the aggrieved party must agree for the
procedures to be applied.222 In some jurisdictions, the judge plays no role in
plea-bargaining, which takes place exclusively between the public prosecutor
and the defendant.223
While the right to counsel may be waived in the US and plea-bargains
accepted in the absence of counsel,224 appointment of counsel is mandatory in
many jurisdictions,225 for settlement discussions to take place, and some civil
law jurisdictions require that the defendant have full discovery of the entire
contents of the investigative file.226 In the US the defendant must explicitly
be advised of his or her right to remain silent, right to confront and crossexamine witnesses, and the right to a jury trial227 and must waive these rights

219

This is true in CR (pp. 17, 20).
IT (p. 15); PO (p. 17); SC (p. 16). In only seven US states does the victim have a right to
participate in plea-bargaining proceedings, US (p. 1).
221
SA (p. 7). In El Salvador the judge must hear the position of the victim, but may order
the “abbreviated procedure” over her objection, Amaya Cóbar, supra note 188, at 404. The
aggrieved party has a right to be heard only in France, which, according to Saas, supra note 82,
at 840, means that they seldom will.
222
BU (p. 15); PO (p. 17); RU (§314(1) CCP); BO (§373 CCP); ES (§239(2)(4) CCP). Under
the Spanish conformidad procedures, the defendant must stipulate to the truth of the accusatory
pleading, whether that of the public prosecutor, the private prosecutor (victim) or the popular
prosecutor, whichever seeks the most serious qualification of the criminal act and the highest
punishment. Similary, in Chile, if the victim charges a more serious charge that carries with it
a punishment that exceeds five years, the procedimiento abreviado will not apply, CH (§408
CCP). The victim must agree to the conformidad-like proceedings, as well, in the CCP-Tierra
del Fuego, Sarrabayrouse, supra note 161, at 302.
223
SC (pp. 15-16). The court may not refuse to accept a plea and may only ask the prosecutor
to reconsider. The imposition of punishment, however, which is not subject to bargaining, is
completely up to the judge. Prosecutor and defense, following recent reforms, may also agree
on a narrative of the offense for purposes of fixing the limits of aggravation and mitigation, Id.,
p. 22.
224
According to Iowa v. Tovar, 541 US 77 (2004), counsel may be waived without the necessity
of advising the defendant that waiving counsel may leave him ignorant of viable defenses and
deprive him of the opportunity to obtain useful legal advice about the wisdom of pleading
guilty, US (p. 8-9). The US Supreme Court has even validated waivers of the right to counsel
and pleas of guilty by arguably schizophrenic people to capital murder! Godinez v. Moran, 509
US 389 (1993).
225
BU (p. 13); MO (§506(3)(1-2) CCP); LA (§83(2) CCP).
226
BU (p. 13). This is not true in the US, where the prosecutor need not reveal exculpatory
evidence prior to a plea and this does not undermine the “knowing” nature of the plea, United
States v. Ruiz, 536 US 622 (2002), US (p. 3).
227
US (p. 3).
220
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on the record in open court for the guilty plea to be accepted. Similar waivers
are required in other countries as well.228
In proceedings before ICTY and ICTR, four basic requirements are
required for a plea to be accepted.229 The plea must be made voluntarily in full
cognizance of the nature of charge and its consequences. Iit must be informed,
not only in relation to the recognition of guilt, but also to the implications of
a guilty plea in the context of defense strategy. It must be unequivocal,230 and
there must be a factual basis for the plea.231
In the US and in some other countries, the prosecution may not use any
statements made by the defendant during discussions related to consensual
proceedings in a trial if the negotiations break down or if the consensual
procedures are rejected by the judge.232
3.2.7. Does Charge or Sentence Bargaining Precede the Application of the
Procedure?
As the term plea bargaining in America indicates, intensive bargaining and
negotiating between public prosecutor and defendant, and sometimes even
the judge, usually precedes the defendant’s “guilty plea.”233 In the U.K., on the
contrary, it is maintained that the guilty plea is induced only by an expectation
of a mitigated sentence if one pleads guilty.234
In most of the new systems that have sprouted up in civil law jurisdictions
there is no specific mention of bargaining, only a codified establishment of the
discount a person will be entitled to upon consensual resolution of the case.
Sometimes a sentence is suggested by the public prosecutor, which invokes
similarities to the Spanish conformidad or the penal order.235 Bargaining,
however, likely occurs outside of court in many of these countries.236 In some
228

In SA (p. 7), the defendant must be advised of the presumption of innocence, the prosecution’s
burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the privilege against self-incrimination.
229
These requirements are listed in Rule 62 bis of ICTY RPE.
230
In the Erdemovic case, the defendant pleaded guilty but said he acted under superior orders
and duress. Since this could have constituted a defense, the appeals chamber refused to accept
the plea and ordered a trial. Knoops, supra note 6, at 259-260.
231
Id.
232
BU (p. 14); this is true in GR (§679-5 CCP) only if the breakdown in negotiations was due to
an unexplained withdrawal of the defendant.
233
In SC (p. 15), there is informal bargaining as to charge and even the narrative relating to the
charge in the accusatory pleading so as to further restrict the judge’s discretion in relation to
assessing aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
234
Hatchard, supra note 203, at 220.
235
In France the public prosecutor makes a public recommendation of sentence at the time of the
guilty plea. FR (§495-8 CCP).
236
IT (p. 15). As to possibility of bargaining in Chile, see Riego, supra note 127, at 463-64.
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countries, participation of the judge is expressly prohibited.237 A more common
occurrence than charge bargaining, however, will be bargaining on the
parameters of the sentence.238 A few countries, however, some of which were
greatly influenced by American consultants during the discussions leading
up to their criminal procedure reforms, have explicitly allowed bargaining
between prosecution and defense before “plea agreements” are reached.239
3.2.8. Judicial Control: May Judge Acquit, Impose Lesser Sentence, Lesser
Charge?
In the US, if a judge accepts an explicit plea bargain, then the judge must
impose the bargained-for punishment.240 The only exception, is if at sentencing
some new evidence has come to the attention of the judge which leads her to
believe that the agreed punishment, or the agreed charge does not reflect the
facts of the case or the relative guilt of the defendant.241 Then the judge must
allow the defendant to withdraw his or her plea of guilty. In the federal system
and in some states, the only promise that might be made to the defendant is
that the prosecution will not oppose his or her request for a certain punishment,
and in such cases the judge may sentence higher than the punishment the
prosecution has agreed not to oppose. At other times, the punishment depends
on the terms of a “plea agreement” and is often dependent on the defendant
testifying in another case truthfully or otherwise aiding with the prosecution of
a more serious case, and if the prosecutor asserts this has not been done, then
the judge may sentence to whatever sentence he or she deems is appropriate,
as long as it is within the sentencing parameters.

237

SA (p. 7). Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 11(c) prohibits the judge from taking part in plea negotiations
in the US federal courts and other US states follow this model. However, other states, such as
California, allow direct involvement of the judge in negotiating the bargain in relation both to
charge and punishment. La Fave et al., supra note 20, at 1002.
238
In SA (pp. 6-7), the parties: may negotiate a “just sentence to be imposed by the court.”
In IT (p. 15), the sentence requested is also a product of bargaining between the parties. In
conformidad proceedings within the framework of Spanish “abbreviated procedure” the
sentence is often a subject of bargaining, SP (pp. 4-5); in CR (p. 19), the party requesting
application of punishment will expressly state the type and length of punishment it desires and
only this punishment may be imposed.
239
This is also the model adopted by the ICTY/R. This is the case with the Estonian “settlement
proceedings.” Sillaots, supra note 205, at 117.
240
Some courts, however, say the judge is never bound, if, during sentence, she thinks the
bargained punishment does not reflect seriousness of the criminal conduct, but others courts
say lenience itself is not a sufficient ground, US (p. 2).
241
If the plea agreement calls for dismissal of charges, a federal court may defer its decision to
accept or reject the bargain until the judge has seen a presentence report and formed an opinion
about the gravity of the underlying conduct, US (p. 2).
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In December 2001, Rule 62 ter of the ICTY RPE was adopted which
provides that prosecution and defense may bargain to amend the indictment,
together recommend a specific sentence or sentencing range, or the prosecutor
may agree not to oppose a request by the accused for a particular sentence
or sentencing range. The plea agreement must normally be disclosed in open
court, and the trial judge is not bound by the parties’ agreement.242
With the Spanish conformidad and some of the modern guilty-plea-like
procedures, the judge may actually acquit the defendant, if he or she finds a
fact that would exclude guilt, either substantively or procedurally.243 In the
conformidad procedures of the Argentine federal CCP, the judge may reject
the procedure due to insufficient knowledge of the facts of the case or because
the qualification of the offense does not correspond to the facts.244 Punishment
may be imposed for lesser offenses, also, if the proposed charges are not
supported by the facts.245 Often the discount is only a 1/3 off of what the judge
would otherwise have imposed as a sentence, which means that there is no
actual promise as to what the sentence will be.246 In some countries, however,
the judge must impose the sentence which the defendant or the parties have
applied for.247

242

Knoops, supra note 6, at 262. In Prosecutor v. Nikolic (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, Feb.
4, 2005, Case No. IT-94-2-!, para. 89, the Appeals Chamber emphasized that Trial Chambers
shall give due consideration to the recommendation of the parties and, should the sentence
diverge substantially from that recommendation, give reasons for the departure.” Id.
243
IT (p. 16). In the ICTY/R an admission of guilt also does not require a conviction. Knoops,
supra note 6, at 263. Judicial Acquittal is also possible in the Argentine province of Tierra del
Fuego, Sarrabayrouse, supra note 161, at 302, Chile, Riego, supra note 127, at 460 and El
Salvador, Amaya Cóbar, supra note 188, at 404-05. In the conformidad-type procedures, the
judge may not sentence to a higher term than that requested by the public (or private or popular)
prosecutor: The same is true in BO (§374 CCP), and El Salvador, Amaya Cóbar, supra note
188, at 405. In Guatemalan “abbreviated trials” rough statistics show, for instance, that judges
returned 203 convictions and three acquittals in Guatemala City in 1996, 174 convictions and
10 acquittals in 1997 and 130 convictions and 9 acquittals in 1998, Loarca & Bertelotti, supra
note 174, at 424. In Latvia the judge may “dismiss” the case if there are procedural impediments
to conducting a trial, LA (§542(1)(1) CCP).
244
Córdoba, supra note 38, at 231; cf. Langer, supra note 13, at 55. In Moldova, the judge, after
a detailed examination of the defendant regarding voluntariness of the plea, understanding of
charges, etc. MO (§506 CCP), decides whether to accept or reject the guilty plea. MO (§507
CCP). The judge may reject the procedure in France as well. FR (§495-12 CCP).
245
In SA (pp. 6, 8) the judge may sentence to less than the term already reduced by 1/3 under the
new expedited procedure.
246
In France, prison time may not exceed one year nor be more than 1/2 the amount of time
which would have been assessed under the normal procedure, Saas, supra note 82, at 831.
247
IT (p. 14).
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3.2.10. Judgment: Must Judge Give Reasons? Does it Result in Judgment of
Guilt?
In the Common Law tradition, judges generally do not have to give reasons
for the judgments they issue, even if it is a judgment by a judge sitting alone as
trier of the facts, though judges in the US sometimes do include reasons. Juries
do not have to give reasons in Common Law countries,248 and judges, when
accepting a guilty plea, do not need to write a reasoned judgment. The guilty
plea is itself sufficient to impose judgment. Upon accepting a plea, however,
the judge in the US must be convinced that there is a “factual basis for the
plea.”249 When this requirement is taken seriously,250 which is not always the
case, the recitation of the “factual basis” may simply be that the prosecutor
asserts, that he or she would have proved the contents of the indictment.251
Most modern European procedures with guilty-plea type arrangements,
require some kind of judicial activity which is similar to that a judge must do
after a full-blown trial, usually consisting in the giving of reasons why guilt
was deemed to have been proved and the particular sentence imposed.252 With
the Italian patteggiamento the procedure for writing the judgment (which is not
one of guilt, but tantamount thereto) is much more simple than that required in

248

Though in Austria and in the new Spanish jury system, there has been introduced a requirement
that jurors, for instance in Spain, provide “succinct reasons” why they arrived at their verdict.
249
Fed. R. Crim. p. 11, US (p. 2). Along the same lines, in PO (pp. 16-17), although there will be
no more taking of evidence after a “voluntary acceptance of responsibility,” the circumstances
of the commission of the crime must be “beyond doubt.” Rule 62 bis of ICTY RPE has also
imposed this requirement. Knoops, supra note 6 at 260.
250
Some courts have said the government need not demonstrate strong evidence of guilt in setting
out the factual basis where there is otherwise adequate evidence to support the government’s
allegations, US (p. 4).
251
For an opinion that the procedure announcing the plea and the factual basis is often a “carefully
rehearsed charade during which the participants merely enact a script that was carefully crafted
in the backroom of the prosecutor’s office.” Dubber, supra note 136, at 552 (1997).
252
The requirements for the judgment are the same as in normal cases in Chile, only the facts
relied on are those stipulated in the “abbreviated trial.” Riego, supra note 127, at 460. The same
appears to be the case in Moldova, MO (§509 CCP). In Latvia, the procedure is still called a
“trial” and the judgment must include an appraisal of the legal justification for the agreement and
the measure of punishment. If the judge has a doubt as to guilt he must reject the “agreement.”
LA (§543 CCP). In France the judge must justify (homologuer) the judgment as to the charge,
based usually in the admission, and as to the sentence, based in the characteristics of the
defendant. This judgment has the same effect as a normal judgment of guilt. FR (§§495-9, 49511 CCP). In accordance with a decision of the Constitutional Council, the judge should verify:
“the reality of the acts, their legal qualification and the appropriateness of the punishment.” One
commentator has called this a boiteuse (wobbly) intervention of the judge, Saas, supra, note 82,
at 841.
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a normal case and focuses mainly on appraising the congruity of the sentence
with the facts of the case.253 The same is true in other countries.254
On the other hand, it appears that in Estonia and other countries, the judge
must either accept or reject the “settlement” but if it is accepted, there is no
formal judgment, but just an affirmation of the terms of the agreement, which
include charge, damages to the aggrieved party and sentence.255
3.2.11. Can the Defendant Appeal after Agreeing to Consensual Procedures?
In some countries, the defendant has no right to appeal the results of a
consensual procedure if the judgment is not more severe than that which was
promised him in the bargain, or by statute.256 In others, the right to appeal is
sancrosanct, even after the invocation of consensual proceedings.257
In the US a plea-bargain, otherwise attractive to the defendant, may include
as a condition thereof, waiver of the right to appeal258 or to take other postconviction action, such as a writ of habeas corpus.259 In other countries such
waivers are expressly prohibited until after the defendant has actually been
sentenced.260 A guilty-plea coupled with dismissal of charges and sentence
253

IT (p. 14, 16), the judge must give reasons, even if succinctly on the impossibility of acquitting
and on the congruity of punishment.
254
In BU (p. 15), a judge who accepts a “plea agreement” need not write a fully reasoned
judgment; in CR (pp. 19-21), the court shall only state “the circumstances that were taken
into consideration in imposing punishment” and bases this “judgment” on the facts in the
investigative dossier; in SP (p. 5), the court must verify that the qualification of the crime
subject to the conformidad is correct, the punishment justified, and that the defendant’s decision
was made freely and knowingly.
255
ES (§249 CCP).
256
In SP (p. 6), appeal is only possible if the deal was violated or if consent is coerced; in IT
(p. 17), a patteggiamento cannot be appealed, but may be reviewed in cassation based on an
allegation that the defendant did not actually waive important procedural rights.
257
In SC (p. 16), the defendant may always appeal, but may not move to withdraw her plea.
Appeal is allowed according to the regular procedure in the Argentine federal CCP, Córdoba,
supra note 38, at 232, and following the “abbreviated procedure” in Chile. Riego, supra note
127, at 460-61, notes that appeal is considered to be more important in such cases due to the
weakness of the factual foundation for a finding of guilt. An appeal in cassation is permitted in
LA (§542(2) CCP). As to the right to appeal in France, see Saas, supra note 82, at 841.
258
US (pp. 3-4). Some courts have held that after a guilty plea, a defendant may not litigate the
voluntariness of a confession given to the police, McMann v. Richardson, 397 US 759 (1970)
or whether the proceedings should have been barred by double jeopardy, United States v. Broce,
488 US 563 (1989). Id.
259
Although in US (p. 4), a habeas corpus action based on incompetence of counsel may never
be waived as part of a plea bargain.
260
DE (p. 32), except minor cases with punishment of less than 21 daily rates or 3000 Kroner,
which are not subject to appeal. Sometimes the prosecutor will bargain to dismiss other cases if
the defendant does not appeal, but this practice is viewed as highly questionable.
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discounts in the US may be withdrawn before accepted by the judge,261 and
even after acceptance, if the judge has not yet pronounced sentence.262 After
sentence withdrawal of a plea usually requires the defendant to show that a
“manifest injustice” will occur.263
3.2.12. Criticism in the Literature
In European countries with the inquisitorial tradition in which the investigating
official, the juge d’instruction was originally also the sentencing official, the
legislator has been meticulous to ensure that the judge who presides over the
consensual resolution of the case is not either the investigating magistrate, or,
of course, the ultimate trial judge. In 1988 the Spanish Constitutional Court
found an earlier version of abbreviated trial to be unconstitutional because the
investigating magistrate acted as trial judge in the abbreviated procedure.264
The new conformidad provisions, in which the investigating magistrate (juez
instructor) presides over arraignment, formulation of charges, and eventual
conformidad in the mostly flagrant cases subject to expedited trial, has also
been criticized because the role of sentencing and investigating judge have
been combined.265
In Italy, the roles of two pretrial judges have been differentiated, so as not
to confuse the judge who exercises control over the preliminary investigation,
the so-called giudice delle indagine preliminarii with the giudice dell’udienza
preliminaria, who supervises the alternative procedures, including the
patteggiamento.266
Generally, consensual procedures are still criticized in civil law countries
for violating the legality principle by not requiring an actual trial267 and a
261

United States v. Hyde, 520 US 670 (1997), US (p. 5).
For instance, if there is a “fair and just reason,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2), such as a witness’s
credible recanting of testimony, the discovery of potentially exculpatory evidence United
States v. Ruiz, 229 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2000), or an intervening court decision that might entitle
defendant to a dismissal, United States v. Ortega-Ascanio, 376 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 2004), US (p.
5).
263
Fed. R. Crim.P. 32, US (p. 5).
264
V. Gimeno Sendra et al., Derecho Procesal Penal 32, 765-66 (1996); the French injonction
pénale was invalidated in 1994 by the Conseil constitutionnel for similar reasons. Pradel, supra
note 75, at 204.
265
Proponents of the new law note, however, that the juez instructor has not yet performed
any investigative functions when these cases come before her in the municipal investigative
courts, usually the next day after arrest, SP (p. 7). This criticism has also been levied against
the El Salvadoran “abbreviated procedure” which is conducted by the investigating magistrate.
Amaya Cóbar, supra note 188, at 405.
266
W. T. Pizzi & Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to Establish an Adversarial Trial System in
Italy, 25 Mich. J. Int’L L 429, 436 (2004).
267
Some Argentine critics interpret the constitutional right to a previous trial before imposition of
sentence as being non-waivable, and requiring, theoretically, a jury trial (the constitutional right
262
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clear judicial finding of guilt.268 Prosecutorial charging, or the maximum
punishment requested, determines whether the guilty plea procedures will be
used in some countries, thus allowing the prosecutor to effectively engineer the
avoidance of a trial with all the guarantees.269 Some critics see such procedures
as inherently coercive,270 while others believe they open up the possibility
of unequal treatment of similarly situated cases in different courts due to
different approaches of prosecutors or judges.271 In other countries, critics see
the consensual procedures as violating the right to a defense, the presumption
of innocence, and the right to personal liberty for similar reasons.272 Some
critics feel that plea-bargaining systems lead to disproportionate lenience in
sentencing in relation to the serious of the crime.273 The lack of traditional
reasons for the judgment and the limited appellate possibilities have also been
subject to criticism.274 On the other hand, the procedural economy gained by
such mechanisms has often been considered to be more important than the
procedural deficits on the other side.275
to jury trial in Argentina, guaranteed since 1857, has still not been implemented with legislation
however!), Bovino, supra note 161, at 67. Cf. Córdoba, supra note 38, at 236-37; others, like
Gustavo Bruzzone, believe the right can be waived like other important constitutional rights.
Id., at 237. For a view that the relative disappearance of lay participation in both the US, due
to plea bargaining, and in Germany, due to confession bargaining, expansion of the jurisdiction
of the single judge courts and the use of diversion and penal orders, has led to a deficit in
legitimation of the justice systems. Dubber, supra note 136, at 553, 601.
268
SP (p. 14); in BU (p. 15), this was cause for vehement criticism when the new procedureswere
introduced although the criticism has since subsided. The Estonian settlement proceedings
have been criticized, because the bargaining is conducted before the defendant agrees to the
stipulation. If there is a full confession, which need not be the case, the punishment has been set
before the full facts of the case have been laid out. Sillaots, supra note 205, at 120-21.
269
This is true with Spanish conformidad as well as with its Argentine offspring, Bovino, supra
note 161, at 66.
270
CR (p. 21). In SC (p. 20), as well, critics feel that plea-bargaining induces the innocent to
forego a trial and punishes those who are convicted after trial; as to Argentina, see Córdoba,
supra note 38, at 250.
271
In BU (p. 16), there are fears that wealthy defendants can bribe the prosecutors for sweet deals.
In the US (p. 6), prosecutors may reward defendants, whose lawyers are generally compliant in
encouraging plea-bargains or to ensure future compliance, or may refuse otherwise justifiable
bargains to please victims or the police.
272
IT (p. 17).
273
BU (p. 16); see US (p. 6), for the opinion that it is “irrational” to reduce otherwise appropriate
sentences just due to save court time. In SC (pp. 20-21), the High Court has set aside some
judgments on the grounds of excessive lenience of the sentence, at times because the plea was
entered late in the proceedings, thus sacrificing the goals of procedural economy.
274
DE (p. 33). In Argentina the conformidad procedure has been criticized for justifying
mitigation in the procedural behavior of the defendant, rather than in facts relating to the crime
or the person of the defendant. Córdoba, supra note 38, at 247.
275
CR (p. 21); after early criticism, the new procedure has been welcomed in BU (p. 16) due to
its speeding up of caseloads and there are efforts to extend it to drug cases. In SC (p. 20), the
High Court has given its stamp of approval for plea-bargaining based on reasons of procedural
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In the US the great disparities between minimum and maximum
punishments and the limited sentencing discretion enjoyed by judges in the
federal and some state systems, due to the presence of sentencing guidelines,
have led to criticism that it is the prosecutor, rather than the court, who
determines the charge and the sentence with little influence of the court.276 It
is also often remarked, that it is the innocent themselves that are most coerced
into entering pleas, because the differential between maximum and minimum
punishments is the greatest, for the weakness of the prosecution’s case will
lead it to accept even a minimal or token punishment.277 Even if the defendant
is guilty, the Draconian sentences constitute such a pressure to plead guilty
that John Langbein has compared American plea-bargaining to the use of
torture on the pre-19th Century European continent.278 The nearly uncontrolled
opportunity principle in the US, coupled with sprawling untheoretical penal
codes containing multiple offenses with nearly the same elements, also enable
the public prosecutor to “overcharge” cases in order to pressure the defendant
to plead guilty with the promise of dismissing charges.279
Furthermore, US plea-bargaining has been criticized because it encourages
deception, gamesmanship and outright dishonesty in the relations between
prosecution and defense.280 Illegal searches and interrogation methods
are directly or indirectly encouraged by the prevalence of plea-bargaining,
because the violations will never be litigated in court, or the right to litigate
them will be waived as part of the plea-bargain.281
economy and has stressed that it raises public confidence in the court system when only the
most serious or the most disputed cases are brought to a full-blown trial. In Costa Rica, judges
and prosecutors are satisfied with the new abbreviated procedure due to its savings in time and
resources. Llobet Rodríguez, supra note 172, at 435.
276
US (p. 1). Langbein condemns the merging of “accusatory, decisional and sentencing phases
of procedure in a single official, the prosecutor.” Langbein, supra note 51, at 18.
277
Damaska, supra note 4, at 1028; Langbein, supra note 51, at 13; Dubber, supra note 136, at
600. See also US (p. 6).
278
See in general, Langbein, supra note 51. Both are methods to bypass the evidentiary demands
of the procedure, whether it be those of the formal rules of evidence derived from Canon
law, or the complicated evidentiary rules of American procedure. Both systems are and were
equally ineffective in ensuring reliability of the “coerced” admissions and equally productive
of cynicism about the way the criminal law is administered. US (p. 7); on the other hand,
Stuntz and Scott claim that the wide margins between maximum and minimum sentences do not
necessarily compel pleas, for such a claim would punish the lenience offered by prosecutors in
such cases, Id., p. 8.
279
Id., p. 9. Stuntz and Scott admit, however, that if plea bargaining were disallowed and all
cases went to trial, overcharging would stop. Id. p. 10. According to Damaska, supra note 4, at
1027, overcharging compels the American defendant to “spend his bargaining chips to reduce
charges down to the level that was the prosecutor’s desideratum all along.”
280
US (p. 6).
281
US (p. 6). For instance, issues of arguably compelled confessions, McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759 (l970), or illegally constituted grand juries, Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258
(l973), are foreclosed by a guilty plea.
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It has been further alleged that it is the incredibly complicated, time-andresource-consuming American jury trial that has led to such a steady growth
of plea-bargaining. Some voices have called for simplification of the jury trial,
or more use of court trials,282 or even the mixed court, in order to extend more
trials to more people.
On the other hand, there are voices in the literature who feel that there will
be even more convictions of the innocent if cases were tried before professional
judges, mixed courts, or even juries if the procedures were expedited with less
guarantees for the defense.283
3.2.13. Benefits in Procedural Economy: Extent of Usage of Guilty Plea
Mechanisms
No civil law country has come even close to the procedural economy benefits
enjoyed by the US with its system of uncontrolled plea-bargaining where
over 95% of all cases are resolved by a guilty plea.284 An earlier Bulgarian
system of consensual resolution of cases was applied in around 36.6%
of cases from 2000 to 2005 but statistics are not available yet for the new
system.285 In Guatemala, around 25% of all convictions were achieved via
“abbreviated procedure” from 1996-1998.286 In the first half of the year 2000,
22% of misdemeanors and 52% of felonies were resolved in the Argentine
province of Buenos Aires by using the abbreviated procedure.287 In Spain it
has been estimated that between 15 and 30% of cases are resolved with a
conformidad.288 The figure for Italy’s patteggiamento was between 17 and 21%
of cases in the misdemeanor courts and between 34 and 42% in the mid-level
trial courts in the years 1990-1998.289 In the main trial court in the Argentine
province of Tierra del Fuego, there were 55 regular trials and 52 conformidadtype procedures in over three years. Of those who went to trial, 67.02% were
convicted and 32.98% acquitted, whereas 81.69% were convicted and 16.9%
282

US (p. 6).
Id., p. 8.
284
US (p. 1). In 2001 over 96% of federal cases ended in plea bargains. E. Lichtblau, Ashcroft
Limiting Prosecutors’ Use of Plea Bargains, New York Times, Sept. 23, 2003, at A1, A25.
Similar statistics exist, however, in SC (p. 17), where, in 2004-05, 97% of all district court cases
(excluding dismissals) were resolved through plea bargaining, 93% of Sheriff’s court summary
proceedings and 81% of Sheriff’s Court solemn proceedings. The percentage dropped, however,
to 63% in high court jury cases.
285
BU (pp. 13-14, where less than 5% of proposed settlements were rejected by the trial
courts).
286
Loarca & Bertelotti, supra note 174, at 423.
287
Langer, supra note 13, at 56-57.
288
Gimeno Sendra et al., supra note 264, at 330.
289
Langer, supra note 13, at 52-53.
283
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acquitted in the cases resolved without trial. In the lower correctional courts,
however, nearly all the cases resolved without trial ended in convictions.290
The consensual mechanisms have, on the other hand, not been successful
in significantly unburdening the courts in countries where defendants feel they
can get better results by demanding trial according to the normal procedures
and either depending on the lenient sentencing practices of the courts,291 or
their successful manipulation of the normal procedures.

4. Simplified and Abbreviated Trial Proceedings
4.1. Abbreviated Trial Procedures Not Involving Admissions or
Stipulations of Guilt
4.1.1. Statutorily Regulated Trials Based on the Investigative Dossier
The 1988 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, the chief aim of which was a turn
to adversary procedure and an oral trial buttressed with a strict prohibition on
use of evidence from the dossier of the preliminary investigation, introduced
the giudizio abbreviato, which ironically allows the defendant to elect to be
tried by the judge of the investigation on the basis of the written evidence
in the preliminary investigation dossier in classical inquisitorial style.292 The
inducement to select the old inquisitorial written trial is a discount of onethird on what otherwise would have been the sentence, and a reduction to
thirty years of any sentence of life imprisonment.293 The punishment following
an abbreviated trial in the court of appeal, however, can be freely negotiated
between the parties.294
Since amendments to the law in 1999, the defendant may compel trial
by the abbreviated procedure, even if the public prosecutor and judge are
290

Sarrabayrouse, supra note 161, at 307.
In CR (pp. 22-24), there were only two “requests for rendering judgment” since 2004, likely
due to the mild criminal policy in Croatia, where 67.48% of all sentences are suspended and those
prison sentences imposed are often within 1/2 of the upper limit, thus making the consensual
procedures irrelevant. Only 1% of cases were concluded with the “abbreviated procedure” in
El Salvador from the time of its introduction on March 20, 1998, through May 30, 1999, while
victim-offender conciliation resolved 31.77% of cases in that time. Amaya Cóbar, supra note
188, at 408-09.
292
For an interesting ancient precursor to this procedure, one could see the procedure developed
in the Paris abbey courts around 1300, whereby the accused could “accept the inquest,” or
stipulate to the results of the examination conducted by the investigating magistrate which had
the advantage of allowing the accused to avoid being tortured. Dawson, supra note 73, at 51.
293
IT (pp. 18-19).
294
In such cases the defense will renounce certain appellate grounds, IT (pp. 18-19).
291
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in opposition.295 In addition to basing the judgment on the contents of the
preliminary investigation dossier, the defendant in the giudizio abbreviato,
since 1999, may request to be interrogated, and may even ask the judge to call
additional witnesses or adduce other types of evidence. If the judge, however,
determines that this would defeat the goal of procedural economy underlying
the abbreviated procedure, she may insist the case follow the full-blown trial
procedure. Once the judge allows the defendant, however, to offer additional
evidence, the prosecutor may offer additional evidence in rebuttal and the
judge may also sua sponte ask that further evidence be taken.296
In Bulgaria, the judge may sentence below the minimum sentence if the
defendant agrees to be tried based on the contents of the investigative file and
agrees to curtail the questioning of certain witnesses and experts.297 Similar
procedures have also been introduced in some Latin American jurisdictions298
and in the former Soviet republics on the Baltic Sea.299
4.1.2. Statutorily Regulated Simplification of the Taking of the Evidence
Amendments to the 1988 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure have allowed
the prosecutor and defense to stipulate to include any and all documents
contained in the preliminary investigation dossier in the “trial dossier,” which
actually goes to court and is admissible during the trial.300 The code originally
limited this trial file to pretrial depositions conducted in an adversary fashion,
guaranteeing the confrontation rights of the defendant and other evidence
“which cannot be repeated at trial.”301
295

IT (p. 20). Certain opinions of the Italian Constitutional Court determined that the statute had
to be interpreted to give the defendant this evidentiary initiative and legislation codified these
changes. The victim also has no control over the decision, IT (p. 18).
296
IT (p. 18). In cases where additional evidence is proffered, the procedure begins to look like a
trial in an inquisitorial country like the Netherlands, where most of the evidence is merely read
to the trial court and only selected witnesses testify.
297
BU (p. 11).
298
In §§500-501 CCP-Neuquen (Argentina), the public prosecutor, defense and the complaining
witness can request that the trial be held on the basis of the preliminary investigation file. The
trial consists then in the parties indicating the evidence which supports their positions and
the defendant may request to be heard. The judge then decides the guilt question. There is no
statutory reduction of the punishment, however. Vitale, supra note 134, at 366-67.
299
In Estonia, a “trial on the file” is possible in all cases but those punished by life imprisonment.
ES (§233 CCP). The accused may ask to be interrogated, ES (§237(5) CCP) and may then be
acquitted by the judge or will get a mandatory 1/3 reduction in what would otherwise have been
the appropriate sentence. ES (§238 CCP). In Latvia, the accused may “agree to not require the
taking of evidence during the trial.” LA (§71(6) CCP).
300
IT (p. 20).
301
IT (§421 CPP), see E. Amodio & E. Selvaggi, An Accusatorial System in a Civil Lat Country:
the 1988 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, 62 Temple L. Rev. 1211, 1217 (1989).
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While there are no statutory discounts in sentence coupled with such
stipulations, it cannot be ruled out that bargaining could take place around
negotiations to stipulate to the reading of certain testimony to expedite the
trial process.
Spain introduced an abbreviated trial procedure in 1988 which applies to
cases in which the maximum sentence of deprivation of liberty could be nine
years. It involves a streamlined preliminary investigation in which the public
prosecutor, rather than the investigating magistrate, assumes the initiative in
the gathering of evidence, and in which the procedural requirements at the trial
stage have also been streamlined. The defendant does not necessarily have any
role in selecting this procedure and no statutory discounts are involved.302
4.1.3. Non-Statutorily Regulated Simplification of the Taking of the
Evidence
While most Absprachen in Germany involve agreements reached between
prosecutor, defense and court involve the negotiating of an in-court
confession,303 they will not infrequently involve negotiations to shorten the
trial by not calling certain witnesses, or by withdrawing motions for the taking
of further evidence.304
4.1.4. Criticism
In Bulgaria, the abbreviated procedure has been praised by the public
prosecutor and the judiciary because of the saving of time and resources and
by defense counsel due to the benefits accorded in sentencing. However it
has also been criticized for undermining the principle of material truth and,
from the victim’s point of view, for being too lenient.305 The pioneering Italian
legislation has been subject to little criticism because it has been seldom
used.306

302

SP (p. 4).
See section 4.2.4., infra.
304
Such bargaining between prosecution and defense to shorten the trial also exists in BR (p.
8).
305
BU (p. 12).
306
IT (p. 19).
303
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4.2. Inducing and Bargaining for Confessions to Expedite and
Simplify the Trial
4.2.1. Introduction
From the beginnings of criminal procedure, the confession has always been
the main simplifier and expediter of criminal proceedings. When the defendant
has confessed, the preliminary investigation may be curtailed or terminated.
Similarly, when the defendant admits the charges at trial, the taking of
evidence at trial may be curtailed, or the case may move directly on to closing
arguments and deliberation of the court.
4.2.2. The Pre-trial Confession as Trigger for Expedited or Simplified
Proceedings
Many of the expedited trial procedures used in Europe307 and Latin America308
allow for a skipping of the preliminary investigation and the setting of a
trial within a short period of time when the defendant has given a credible
confession to the police or the authorized investigative official during the
pretrial stage. In Norway, a credible pretrial confession will lead to a case
being tried by a single professional judge, rather than a mixed or jury court.309
In Denmark, a confession will trigger a summary trial without even the filing
of an accusatory pleading.310
In Japan, a person who confesses will normally be released from pretrial
detention and, following a substantially simpler trial will usually be sentenced
to either credit for time served or a substantially more mitigated punishment
than she would otherwise have gotten had she remained silent and fought the

307

Such as the Italian giudizio immediato, or the German beschleunigtes Verfahren, which
may apply when the “facts are clear.” See Thaman, supra note 39, at 308-09. Some countries
also apply expedited trial procedures to misdemeanors or crimes which do not involve pretrial
detention. See the Chilean procedimiento simplificado, CH (§388 CCP), which applies where
the maximum punishment could be 540 days deprivation of liberty and which allows the control
judge (juez de garantías) to impose punishment and which, like the new Spanish expedited
trials, seeks to induce an early conformidad or acuerdo reparatorio, CH (§241 CCP), which is
similar to victim-offender conciliations. Riego, supra note 127, at 470-71.
308
This is allowed in the Argentine Province of Neuquen, as long as there is no objection from
the public prosecutor, victim or the defense, the case is not complicated and no pretrial detention
is involved. §§497-500 CPP-Neuquen. Vitale, supra note 134, at 366.
309
This procedure is only applicable if the maximum punishment is less than 10 years. The public
prosecutor must consent, no formal accusatory pleading is filed, and there will be virtually no
further taking of evidence, NO (p. 4).
310
DE (p. 18).
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charges. This has led some critics to characterize such a procedural system
as one of “plea bargaining” although the Japanese themselves consider their
system to be the antithesis thereof.311
4.2.3. Confession at Trial as Trigger of Expedited and Simplified
Proceedings
In many civil law jurisdictions the trial commences with the reading of the
accusatory pleading and the questioning of the defendant as to whether
he or she wishes to admit the charges. As was seen above, with Spanish
conformidad, applicable in cases punishable by less than six years in the
normal courts,312 the defendant will then be immediately sentenced. In some
countries, statutory provisions allow for either a greatly truncated taking of
evidence313 or even, in some cases, transition directly to closing statements
and deliberation of the court.314 In other countries, there need not even be
reasons given for the factual or legal underpinnings of the guilt-finding,
311

Johnson, supra note 56, at 142-45.
In Kazakhstan, the procedure applies only to crimes of slight or mid-level seriousness,
KA (§363(1) CCP) and in Lithuania grave or major crimes are excluded. LI (§269(1) CCP).
§406(1) of the Draft-CCP of Turkmenistan would apply the procedure only to cases where no
preliminary investigation was conducted.
313
In NE (p. 21) the confession does not theoretically lead to a truncation of evidence-taking,
but in reality little corroboration is needed for a conviction (finding the body of a murder victim
would be sufficient). In NI (§271 CCP), following a spontaneous admission of the charges at
trial, the judge may suspend the case for five days to take further evidence or may set the case
over for sentencing without trial in 15 days. In some countries, following a confession, the
court will question the defendant and the victim and immediately move to closing argument
and judgment. KA (§363(3) CCP). In §406(3) of the Draft-CCP of Turkmenistan, a confession
will lead to the questioning of the defendant and the victim, the arguments of the parties and the
rendering of judgment. In Lithuania, the defendant is thoroughly examined as to the veracity
of her confession but must waive the oral taking of other evidence. LI (§269(1) CCP). The
evidence in the preliminary investigation file, however, is then read in court, LI (§287(1) CCP).
Prior to the 2004 CCP, Estonian “simplified proceedings” followed this model. Sillaots, supra
note 205 at 117-18.
314
BU (p. 11). In DE (pp.18, 28-29), the defendant must not only admit the acts underlying the
charge but the actual crime charged. Then the case proceeds immediately to sentence without
any taking of evidence. Both prosecutor and defense must consent to this procedure which has
been in force since 1911. Such a provision was introduced in the 1993 Russian jury law but was
seldom used and disappeared in the 2001 Russian Code of Criminal Procedure. S. C. Thaman,
The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia, 16 Stanford J. Int’L L. 61, 103-104 (1995). It
found its way into the CCP of Belarus, BE (§326(1) CCP). The Argentine omisión de pruebas,
§408 Federal CCP, provides for moving directly to argument following a full confession of
the defendant, provided that the public prosecutor, the victim, and defense counsel and the
judge agree. Similar provisions can be found in §377 CPP-La Pampa, and in the CCPs of
other Argentine provinces such as Salta, Mendoza, San Juan, Santiago del Estero and La Rioja.
Sarrabayrouse, supra note 161, at 303-04. Such procedures were included in the now obsolete
312
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though the sentence must be reasoned.315 Finally, in a third group of countries,
the court may acquit if, despite the confession, it determines the evidence of
guilt to be insufficient.316
4.2.4. Outright Bargaining for Confessions in the Trial Court
In many systems trial judges have always exercised direct or indirect pressure
on criminal defendants to admit their guilt so as to simplify the trial. Implicit
in such pressure is a guarantee or promise that the defendant will receive a
mitigated sentence.317 As early as 1960, reported decisions of the German
Supreme Court revealed such pressure applied by trial judges aimed at
inducing confessions, yet the issue there was whether such pressure violated
the law prohibiting coerced confessions.318
It was only in 1982, however, that a German lawyer319 revealed to the
general legal community what had been going on for years in the German
criminal trial courts: the fact that in many cases judges, prosecutors and
defense counsel were negotiating the confessions of defendants in exchange
for a guaranteed mitigated punishment, so as to simplify and expedite the
criminal trial.320 While Deal maintained that the practice began with narcotics
cases, its primary use was in cases of economic and environmental crime,
where the complicated nature of the cases, the voluminous files, and the
multiplicity of charges that could be filed made them the most likely candidate
for trial-simplifying bargaining.321 The secrecy of this practice was required
inasmuch as such negotiations appeared to clearly violate the principle of
1973 Costa Rican CCP. Llobet Rodríguez, supra note 172, at 436 and exist in Panama as well,
PA (§2243 Judicial Code).
315
NE (pp. 11, 21).
316
BU (p. 11).
317
Although no bargaining apparently takes place in NE (p. 21), there is an implicit recognition
that a mitigated sentence will follow and Dutch judges have a huge discretion in all cases to
mitigate, even down to a fine of only 1 Euro. In earlier German jurisprudence, a confession was
an accepted mitigating factor as long as it was motivated by remorse and inner acceptance of
guilt. Under the modern practice of Absprachen, however, see infra, this is no longer the case,
GE (p. 56).
318
BGHSt 14, 189, 190 (1960), cited in Thaman, supra note 39, at 310-11.
319
Writing under the pseudonym “Detlev Deal aus Mauschelhausen” in Der Strafverteidiger
(1982), at 545, GE (p. 46).
320
GE (pp. 40-41). Even legal scholars who claimed to expertise in German criminal law and
procedure were completely unaware of what was going on in the German courtrooms. See J.
H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 204
(1979). Altenhain maintains that the practice probably did not exist in its present form before
1970, while Hamm claims such deals have always taken place, GE (p. 68), evidence of which
could be the decision of the German Supreme Court cited above.
321
GE (pp. 69-70). Since most such crimes did not have an obvious victim, they were treated as
less-serious and thus suitable for the under the table procedures. Id.
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official investigation of criminal cases.322 Much as was the case in the US,
the practice was finally challenged before the higher courts, and the German
Supreme Court finally has issued a number of rulings approving of confession
bargaining, provided that certain minimal procedural guarantees are met.
The main decision in this respect, was that of August 28, 1997,323 in which
a kind of rulebook for confession bargaining was laid out. The German
Supreme Court stated that for a deal or Absprache to be accepted, the court
may indicate a maximum sentence lower than the maximum sentence
provided by law, but may not firmly set out the magnitude of the punishment
to be imposed and, indeed, must advise the defendant that it might exceed
the indicated punishment if new facts arise not known to the court at the time
of the negotiations.324 Although the discussions may occur off the record
and even outside of court,325 they must be publicly announced in court and
put on the record.326 The results of the negotiations must be communicated,
of course, to the defendant, who seldom directly takes part,327 and the lay
assessors, who are also seldom directly involved.328 Although the aggrieved
party has full participatory rights during the trial in certain cases, especially
those of sexual violence, as the “collateral complainant” (Nebenklägerin), and
should be included in the discussions about negotiating an Absprache, this
often does not happen.329 The collateral complainant may appeal the “deal”
but may not do so on grounds of an inappropriate punishment, the most
likely ground she would allege.330 The punishment imposed in the end must
322

GE (p. 40).
BGHSt 43, 195, GE (p. 44). For an English translation of this decision, see Thaman, supra
note 19, at 145-50.
324
GE (p. 58). Research has shown that, despite this language in the jurisprudence, the maximum
indicated sentence usually always turns out to be the actual sentence or at most three to four
months less, thus making the German practice more similar to American plea-bargaining in
practice. The final sentence never exceeds the indicated maximum, GE (p. 58-9).
325
A German judge told me that much of the negotiations traditionally took place when the
judge, prosecutor and defense counsel took breaks in the trial to smoke. Thus, ironically, nonsmoking judges and parties were generally involved in less such bargaining.
326
GE (pp. 45, 53). Investigations have shown, however, that the deal is often not put on the
record, or is only briefly noted, because trial judges are fearful if they put too many details on
the record, they will be reversed on appeal, GE (p. 62). In BR (p. 8), however, the negotiations
are never put on the record, as was the case in Germany before the 1980’s or in the US before
the 1960’s.
327
GE (p. 43).
328
GE (p. 43); this aspect of the 1997 decision, required by the principle of publicity, has not
led to the inclusion of the lay assessors in the great majority of cases, Dubber, supra note
136, at 583, and yet this fact has not led to any reversals of judgments rendered as a result of
Absprachen, GE (pp. 54-55).
329
GE (pp. 67-68).
330
Aggrieved parties who do not constitute themselves as “collateral complainants” have no right
to appeal. No “deal”, however, has been overturned upon appeal of a collateral complainant,
GE (pp. 67-68).
323
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still be proportionate to the defendant’s guilt331 and there may be no chargebargaining: the charge must represent the actual level of defendant’s guilt.332
The defendant may not be subject to any explicit or implicit coercion to make
a judicial confession which would result in a violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination or the right to human dignity.333 Although defendants want
to know the minimum and maximum sentence, the prevailing view is that the
judge should not announce this. It is, however, clear, that the announcement
of a too-wide gap between maximum sentence and sentence offered by the
trial judge, as often happens in the U.S., will result in the agreement being
nullified due to its coercive nature.334
The defendant may not be forced to waive the right to appeal during the
negotiations.335 This is a ticklish point and many cases have been reversed
on appeal on this ground.336 Judge and prosecutor are, of course, eager for a
waiver, but they must not insist on it until after judgment is pronounced and
must hope defense counsel will be a good sport and convince the defendant not
to appeal.337 Seven days after pronouncement of judgment, the case becomes
final if no appeal is entered and then the formal written judgment may be
more skeletal as there will be no appeal.338 Once a “deal” is appealed, it is
more likely to be reversed because the evidence in the record will inevitably
be thinner than after a full trial.
331

GE (p. 47).
The German Constitutional Court found that “deals” were not clearly unconstitutional, but
held that the principles of legal evaluation of facts and imposition of punishment cannot be
thrown completely open to bargaining, BVerfG NStZ 1987, at 419, GE (p. 46). There have been
cases, however, in which an “especially serious” crime has been reclassified as a normal crime,
or a normal crime as a less serious crime. Although there has been no evidence of overcharging
a particular count, as occurs in the US, there has been some evidence of adding numerous lesser
offenses, which are related to the more serious offense, which will then be dismissed due to
the prosecutor’s unsureness as to whether they can be proved at trial as part of negotiations,
GE (pp. 59-60). Although the German CCP only technically allows dismissal of lesser offenses
punishing the same conduct, in practice prosecutors have bargained away “similarly grave”
offenses. This gives a clever lawyer possibility to dismiss just those charges which would be
considered to be the most serious at time of sentencing, GE (p. 41).
333
The judge may offer a lower sentence, but it may not constitute an advantage not provided by
law (i.e. be disproportionate to guilt). The courts are split as to whether the judge may actually
indicate the approximate sentence he or she will impose, GE (p. 56).
334
One case found a gap between six or seven years maximum, and a two years suspended
sentence if the defendant confessed, invalidated the confession on grounds of coercion, GE (pp.
57-58).
335
The defendant may negotiate away his right to appeal, however, in some countries, such as:
BR (p. 8) and the US.
336
GE (pp. 64-65).
337
Defense counsel who are not good sports and encourage or let their clients appeal will not be
dealt with any more. GE (p. 64).
338
GE (p. 63).
332
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Because courts have “encouraged” waiver of the right to appeal despite the
questionable legality of this tactic, the appellate courts have struggled to find
a bright line rule for the courts to follow in this area. Recently, the following
rule was pronounced by the German Supreme Court sitting en banc: (1) the
court must not mention waiver of appeal or influence it; (2) the presiding
judge must instruct the defendant after judgment that he has of an unlimited
right to appeal, and; (3) the waiver of appeal after judgment is without force
if it is not preceded by an advisement of the right to appeal.339 Critics claim
that the admonition as to the right to appeal “cures” any court violations of the
prohibition against influencing or pressuring the defendant.340
Normally the trial judge must be convinced of the credibility of the
confession and even engage in questioning or taking other evidence to
achieve this conviction.341 While some cases involving Absprachen have
been reversed because the confession was merely a procedural act which did
not reveal sufficient evidence to prove guilt,342 in other decisions, however,
courts have accepted confessions as the basis for guilt-findings and mitigated
sentences when the so-called confession has been as bereft of details about
actual guilt as is an American plea of guilty or nolo contendere.343
In cases involving economic crimes the bargaining for confessions
sometimes begins during the preliminary investigation, at the same time as
would occur when the details of penal or diversion orders are discussed, and,
if the latter do not result, a sentence reduction would result in the event of a
confession when the case is set for trial.344 During pretrial negotiations, of
course, only prosecution and defense are involved. The preliminary hearing
is also a place where the parties “feel each other out.” If a deal is reached
pretrial, there is great pressure on the trial judge, who always plays a major
role in negotiations in the trial court, to accept the deal.345
339

BGH NJW 2005, 1440, 1445, GE (p. 65). According to Altenhain’s research, a majority of
“deals” still violate these rules, GE (p. 75).
340
GE (p. 66).
341
GE (p. 60).
342
GE (p. 40). Mere statements that “it was like that,” or stipulations to the correctness of the
charge, have been rejected, because German law does not accept such stipulation. One court
ruled that the confession must be “at least concrete enough, that it can be tested, whether it is
sufficiently consistent with the material in the file and that no further investigation of the facts
appears to be necessary.” GE (pp. 61-62).
343
Some courts have accepted perfunctory acceptances of guilt, claiming the goal of procedural
economy will be lost if the judge must nevertheless meticulously prove the credibility of the
confession, GE (pp. 61-62). For an example of such a decision, see BGH NStZ, 1999, 92,
translated into English in Thaman, supra note 19, at 150-52.
344
GE (p. 41).
345
But most discussions take place in the trial court when defense counsel has more complete
discovery of the state’s case, GE (pp. 41-42). For a recent comparative analysis of the impact
of the participation of the German judge in confession bargaining, compared to the regime
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Outright confession bargaining undoubtedly exists in many countries with
civil law-inspired procedural rules.346
4.2.5. Criticisms of the Confession-Based Procedures
As might be expected, practitioners in Germany praised the practice
of Absprachen on grounds of procedural economy, while the academic
community was overwhelmingly critical because of the perceived violations
of the right to a fair trial; equal protection, the presumption of innocence, the
principles of official investigation and that only judges may impose judgment
on the basis of evidence presented at trial.347
Opponents have also stressed the fact that German law is antipathetical
to bargaining and that the procedures have no basis in the codified law. The
argument is, that judges may not assess the evidence or assess punishment
before having heard the evidence, but proponents emphasize that trial judges
do this all the time when they read the file and pre-evaluate the facts before
trial in deciding whether to impose pretrial detention or set the case for
trial.348 The German Supreme Court has also held that the bargaining opened
up by the introduction in 1974 of diversion proceedings and the opportunity
principle in relation to minor offenses, in its day condemned as a kind of
Verdachtsstrafe or punishment upon suspicion,349 introduced an exception to
the legality principle and opened up the door to bargaining among the parties
and the judge which carried over to more serious cases.350
Despite the opposition of the academic community,351 the overwhelming
view of practitioners who have to work, day-in, day-out, in the criminal
justice system, is that Absprachen are here to stay.352 While the former Social
of judicial involvement in several US states, see J. I. Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea
Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 199 (2006).
346
Confession bargaining to simplify trials existed under the now obsolete Costa Rican CCP of
1973. Llobet Rodríguez, supra note 172, at 436.
347
GE (p. 46).
348
GE (pp. 49-50). Judges also allow dismissals of charges and imposition of measures in
diversion proceedings, and this factor was emphasized by the German Supreme Court in its
1997 decision to show that bargaining and the opportunity principle are not entirely alien to
German law.
349
Opponents such as Weigend and Schünemann, still maintain this view. GE (p. 52).
350
DE (pp. 49-52, 69).
351
Most in the German academic community want “deals” legislatively prohibited, or at least
want the rules of the 1997 Supreme Court decision to be codified. A minority of academia
favors a new code of criminal procedure with more adversarial principles, so that one does not
have an open conflict between inquisitorial and adversarial principles, GE (pp. 77-78).
352
Altenhain, in his study, found a favorability rating of 5.84 on a 7 point scale, GE (p. 75). Most
practitioners also feel, while the rules laid out in the 1997 decision of the Supreme Court are
workable, they are too strict and unrealistic and thereby defeat the purpose of speeding up the
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Democratic government favored a legislative solution, and a draft law based
on the 1997 Supreme Court decision was even circulated,353 the currently
ruling Great Coalition of is no longer pushing amendment of the code.354
4.2.6. Statistics Relating to Use of the Confession-Based Procedures
German Absprachen now are involved in the resolution of perhaps 30-50 %
of German criminal cases.355 The great majority of the cases are still those
involving economic or white-collar crime, where a deal is attempted in 100%
of the cases,356 but it is also used in nearly all kinds of cases, including those
of attempted homicide and manslaughter.357
In Denmark, 13.5% of all cases were handled as summary trials following
a credible confession by the defendant.358 By 2002 in Estonia, the “simplified
trial,” which functioned from 1996 until 2004, 59.8% of all cases were handled
with a confession and reduced punishment.359

5. Conclusion
It is clear that consensual procedures which lead to a truncation or elimination
of phases of criminal procedure – whether it be the preliminary investigation,
the preliminary hearing, the trial itself, or even the rendering of a reasoned
judgment – are here to stay. Most practitioners welcome them due to their
effects on procedural economy,360 whereas academicians tend to be skeptical,
highlighting the violation of the cherished principles of criminal procedure
they studied in school, the pressure such procedures place on defendants,
the sacrifices in the area of truth-ascertainment, and the exclusion of

resolution of cases. They especially underline the prohibition of waiving the right to appeal,
GE (pp. 74-75).
353
GE (pp. 77-78). Proponents of legislation feel it is the only mechanism to get judges to follow
the rules, because they do not hold the decisions of the Supreme Court to be binding.
354
GE (p. 79).
355
B. Huber, Criminal Procedure in Germany, in Hatchard et al, supra note 203, at 159-60.
356
GE (pp. 74-75).
357
GE (pp. 71, 74). It has been deemed not suitable to murder cases, where a mandatory life
sentence (where one actually serves no more than 25 years) must be imposed.
358
DE (p. 18).
359
Sillaots, supra note 205, at 115-16.
360
CR (p. 24); it has been calculated in SC (p. 19), that a plea in the High Court costs 324
pounds whereas a full trial estimated at 13,879 pounds. The respective sums in Sheriff’s
solemn procedure, are 117 pounds for a plea and 6,398 pounds for a trial; in Sheriff’s summary
proceedings, a plea costs 78 pounds and a trial, 1463 pounds.
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victims.361 At times the public itself has also been unwilling to accept the new
procedures.362
The challenge for legislators and courts, where legislators are unwilling
to act, is to find the right balance between the various forms of criminal
procedure available for the trial of various types of criminal cases and to make
sure that none of the forms presents a substantial risk that innocent persons
will be convicted of crime and that convictions are based on procedures
which adequately allow the courts to assess the credibility and strength of the
evidence.
The new forms must also offer a sufficient enough incentive to the parties
to avoid the normal full-blown trial procedures. So far this has not happened
in Italy, where too few defendants choose the consensual procedures, Italy’s
court system is still over-burdened, and it continues to be condemned by the
Eur.Ct. HR due to violations of the right to a speedy trial.363
German academicians who are opposed to the practice of Absprachen,
believe that a system patterned on the penal order should be applied to all
crimes across the board, but should be based on a fully adversarial preliminary
investigation in which the right of the defendant to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses would be protected to the greatest extent possible, and where the
prosecutor, at the end of the investigation, would propose a resolution of the
case which could be accepted or rejected by the defendant. If rejected, the bulk
of the evidence gathered at the preliminary investigation would be admissible
and would, in any event, provide a good foundation for a judge to write a
reasoned judgment justifying the decision on guilt and punishment.364 The
accused could then be punished by no more than the punishment suggested by
the public prosecutor in the proposed resolution of the case, thus avoiding any
problems of reformatiu in peius.365
A lawyer’s draft, on the other hand, suggests a reform of the penal code
which would require a reduction in punishment of at least one-fourth in case
of an Absprache and a reduction of the mandatory minimum sentence by
one-half.366 This has been criticized on grounds of equal protection, because
of a lack of differentiation between a “deal” based on a truthful confession,
or restitution, or one just based on a decision not to call witnesses, for
instance.367
361

CR (p. 24).
In IT (p. 22), the criticism has mainly been that the consensual procedures have reinforced
the inequality in the enforcement of the laws.
363
IT (p. 22).
364
See GE (p. 79)
365
This last provision has been criticized due to fears that a lid on the punishment will mean few
people will accept the prosecutor’s offer, GE (p. 80).
366
GE (p. 82).
367
GE (pp. 82-84).
362
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In the last analysis, one should pose a question which will sound heretical
in the countries of the civil law: if one wishes to resolve the overwhelming
bulk of cases consensually and provides adequate incentives for defendants
to renounce their right to a trial with all the guarantees, shouldn’t one offer
those few persons who wish to gamble a full adversarial trial before a court
where the outcome is not more or less set in stone at the outset, that is of
course, before a classic jury court, where the triers of fact and guilt have no
previous knowledge of the case and can look at the facts through the nonbureaucratized368 eyes of lay persons. It is, of course, only with such a court
that the defense has a real “trump card” to play in the negotiations with court
or prosecutor.369
But even having a jury court as the final arbiter of guilt or innocence is
meaningless, if the system of consensual resolution of cases is more a child
of the inquisitorial practice of coercing confessions rather than an adversarial
procedure between two more or less equal opponents, as was the case with
the Medieval practice of wergeld or composition between victim-accuser
and defendant. Unfortunately American plea bargaining, and any system that
makes the “deal” so tantalizing that going to trial becomes a risky endeavor,
smacks more of inquisitorial coercion of confessions than a contract between
equals.
Furthermore, no system which allows consensual resolution of cases
which could result in deprivation of liberty, especially where there is
inherent coercion, should allow the defendant to will his or her judgment of
conviction without having a real procedure for a judge to verify that there
is a factual basis for the plea. The US does not have such a guarantee, and
therefore Mirjan Damaska is correct, when commenting on the practice of
plea-bargaining in the international criminal tribunals, that guilty pleas in
such a context should look more like the German Absprache, where the judge
must still render judgment and provide reasons, and where the “guilty plea”
consists in a detailed confession of what, in reality, the defendant did to merit
the conviction.370

368

For an opinion that he was a better judge when he was young, inexperienced, and not yet
bureaucratized, see the interview with the current “star” investigating magistrate of Spain’s
National Court, R. Montero, Fernando Grande-Marlaska: En el ojo del huracán, El País
Semanal, June 11, 2006, at 12.
369
For a similar suggestion, see B. Schünemann, Reflexionen über die Zukunft des deutschen
Strafverfahrens, in Strafrecht, Unternehmensrecht, Anwaltsrecht. Festschrift Für Gerd Pfeiffer
482 (1988).
370
Damaska, supra note 4, at 1037-38.
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Appendix 1
Questionaire for Country Studies
I.
A.
1.
a.
b.
c.
d.
2.
a.
b.

c.
d.
e.
3.
a.
4.

a.
B.
1.

Organization of Criminal Procedure (More Serious Crimes)
Pre-Trial Stage
Form of criminal investigation.
Is there a formal preliminary investigation in which the evidence is gathered before the
case is formally charged and brought to trial? If so, is it conducted by an investigating
magistrate or prosecutor or other state official?
Is the investigation informally carried out by police, prosecutor, or other body? Describe.
In arresting suspects and investigating crime, are law enforcement officials required
to pursue all reported cases if they appear to constitute criminal violations? (Legality
Principle). If not (opportunity principle) is their discretion limited by law?
Do defendant and/or victim (aggrieved party) have the right to conduct parallel
investigations? If so, may they independently present their evidence to the court or must
their evidence be funneled through the official investigator (1.1a)?
Confessions and Admissions as Proof of Guilt: Interrogation Practice
Are police allowed to interrogate criminal suspects?
If so, may the police legally interrogate a suspect in the absence of counsel before the
case is turned over to the official investigator or prosecutor? If so, must the suspect be
advised of the right to remain silent before questioning? Must the suspect be advised of the
right to consult with counsel? Must the consult with counsel before the police attempt to
interrogate? If the police fail to advise a suspect, may any statement given by the statement
be used at trial? May any indirect evidence resulting from the statement (physical fruits,
witnesses) be introduced at trial?
If defendant has a right to counsel during interrogation, how is counsel provided to the
indigent suspect? Is the suspect/defendant allowed to waive the right to counsel? Are
confessions/admissions given in absence of counsel admissible in court?
Is the head of the investigation (investigating magistrate, prosecutor) allowed to interrogate
the suspect/defendant? (If so, answer same questions as in 1.2.b and c.)
Are law enforcement officials allowed to bargain for confessions during the pretrial stages?
(by offering release from custody, dismissal of other charges, other favors, etc.)
Which public official or body, if any, reviews the sufficiency of the evidence prior to
charging? Pre-trial judge, investigating magistrate, trial judge, panel of judges, grand
jury?
Is this at a formal adversarial hearing, or conducted ex parte by the official or body? Does
the aggrieved party participate in this proceeding? Describe.
If there is sufficient evidence to charge the case, must the case be charged (legality
principle)? If so, who brings the charges? If the case is not charged, is the prosecutor’s
discretion limited by law (statute or case law)? May the aggrieved party appeal to a judge
or other body to compel prosecution in the event the prosecutor does not charge the case or
undercharges it?
May the aggrieved party or any other citizen bring criminal charges?
Trial Stage (Post-Charge)
Once the case is charged in the trial court, may the charging official (usually prosecutor)
dismiss or reduce the charges on his or her own motion? If he/she feels there is insufficient
evidence to proceed? May the judge block the dismissal of the case? May the aggrieved
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party? If the dismissal is blocked, which official presents the case at trial? May the aggrieved
party act as private prosecutor?
2. May the defendant control the adjudication of his or her case by pleading guilty and
preventing the hearing of the evidence and judgment by the trier of the facts? (if so, answer
further, below, in section V.a )
3. Even if a defendant admits guilt or tries to plead guilty, must the court still pronounce
sentence according to the same rules as used in the normal procedure?
II. Organization of Criminal Procedure (Variations for Lesser Crimes)
A. Procedure for Most Serious Crimes
1. In the prosecution of what types of crimes is the above-described procedure employed?
Crimes punishable by more than a certain number of years deprivation of liberty? Death
Penalty? Are other criteria used? (crimes against the person, crimes against national
security, etc.)
2. What is the composition of the court in which the above-described procedures are used?
If jury, how many jurors, how many professional judges. If mixed court, how many lay
assessors and how many judges? If professional bench, how many judges?
B. Are there Different Procedures for Less Serious Crimes?
1. Is there an elimination or simplification of the preliminary investigation phase (IA.1,
above)? Describe
2. Are there any changes in practices of state officials in relation to the legality principle? Is
there increased discretion not to charge such cases? Increased ability to dismiss without
judicial or aggrieved party intervention? Is private prosecution by the aggrieved party or
others allowed in relation to this level of crime? Explain.
3. What is the composition of the court for the trial of less serious crimes? (answer as in
II.A.2.)
III. Informal Mechanisms to Avoid the Full-Blown Trial (as in I)
A. May the prosecutor choose to charge a crime less serious than the facts would warrant, so
as to avoid the trial court or procedure required for serious crimes (i.e. jury trial, mixed
court), in order for the case to be tried according to the procedure for lesser trials (i.e.,
without preliminary investigation, with only professional judges)? (as in French/Belgian
correctionnalisation)
1. May the aggrieved party object to the case being so charged? May the defendant?
2. May a judge sua sponte prevent such a charging practice?
3. Is this practice approved by statute, case law? Has it been condemned by courts, in the
literature? For what reasons?
4. Does bargaining between prosecutor and defendant sometimes precede this choice of the
prosecutor? If so, describe.
B. May the court sua sponte decide that a case, which could be tried according to the procedure
for serious crimes, shall be tried according to the procedure for lesser crimes? (as in English
either-way offenses)?
1. May the aggrieved party object? May the defendant?
2. Is practice approved by statute, case law? Explain. Has the procedure been condemned by
the courts, in the literature? For what reasons?
3. Does bargaining between defendant, prosecutor or court sometimes precede this choice? If
so, describe.
C. Are there statistics as to how often the above procedures are used?
D. How long have these procedures been in use?
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IV. May the Prosecutor Replace the Charge with a Proposed Judgment which, if Accepted
by the Defendant, will Result in Imposition of Judgment without Formal Charge or Trial
(Penal Orders)
A. If so, for what kinds of offenses is the penal order (or similar procedure) applicable? What
is the maximum punishment possible according to this procedure?
B. Briefly describe the procedure: within how many days must the defendant decide? Does the
aggrieved party have a say in the matter?
C. Does bargaining between defendant and prosecutor sometimes precede the issuance of the
penal order?
D. Does the court actually pronounce judgment? Is it a judgment of guilt or just imposition of
punishment? Explain.
E. Are there statistics indicating how often the procedure is used?
F. Has the practice been condemned by the courts? In the literature? For what reasons?
G. When was this procedure introduced? Has it undergone substantial change?
V. May the Prosecutor and Defendant agree to Pretrial Diversion, or Suspension of the Charges
Conditioned on the Defendant Performing certain Acts, Paying Restitution, etc.?
A. If so, for what kinds of offenses?
B. Briefly describe the procedure. Must the aggrieved party agree?
C. Does bargaining between defendant and prosecutor sometimes precede the decision to
conditionally suspend or divert?
D. Are there statistics indicating how often the procedure is used?
E. Has the practice been condemned by the courts? In the literature? For what reasons?
F. How long has this practice been in effect? Has it undergone substantial change?
VI. Are there Procedures for Victim-Offender-Reconcilliation?
A. If so, to what kinds of offenses are they applicable?
B. To what extent are they incorporated in the diversion or conditional suspension of charge
procedures discussed in V. above?
C. Does bargaining between defendant and victim/prosecutor take place?
D. Have there been a history of abuse on the part of powerful defendants? Powerful victims?
E. Are there statistics indicating how often the procedure is used and how successful it has
been?
F. How long have these procedures been in effect? Have they undergone substantial change?
VII. Guilty Pleas or Stipulations to the Correctness of the Charges
A. May a defendant admit guilt or stipulate to the correctness of the charges and thereby
completely eliminate the taking of evidence, so that the court may move to the
pronouncement of sentence and imposition of punishment? (see above, I.B.2.)
B. Does the procedure require a judicial admission of guilt (guilty plea) or is a stipulation
to the correctness of the charges sufficient? (plea of nolo contendere, conformidad). May
the defendant plead guilty or stipulate to the correctness of the charges while maintaining
innocence?
C. Is the procedure limited to particular types of crimes (i.e. punishable by not more than a
certain number of years deprivation of liberty) or is it unrestricted?
D. Are there statutorily prescribed discounts in punishment? (as in Italian patteggiamento
or Russian soglasie so prediavlennom obvinenii). If so, what discount is guaranteed the
defendant)
E. If there is no statutorily guaranteed discount, are there traditional discounts or “tariffs”
which one can expect in the courts? If so, explain.
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F. Do negotiations between defendant and prosecutor often precede the guilty plea or
stipulation? Do they precede the actual charging of the case? May the court participate in
such negotiations? May the court refuse to accept the negotiated settlement? May the parties
negotiate both the charges to which the person pleads (or stipulates) and the sentence?
(as in American plea bargaining). May the aggrieved party participate in the negotiations?
May the aggrieved party block the execution of the plea or stipulation agreement? Are
the procedures informal, or regulated by statute? Briefly describe how the proceedings are
statutorily regulated.
G. At what point in the procedure may the guilty plea or stipulation be proposed and realized?
Must it be done before the case is set for trial? Is it done at a particular stage, such as the
preliminary hearing or on arraignment in the trial court? may it be done during trial?
H. Must the court still pass judgment and provide reasons for the guilt-finding and the
imposed sentence? May the court actually find the defendant not guilty if the file reveals an
impediment to a guilt-finding or insufficiency of evidence? Does the court actually find the
defendant guilty, or merely impose punishment? Explain.
I. May the defendant appeal? May the prosecutor require the defendant to give up the right to
appeal? To give up any other statutory or constitutional rights, other than the right to a fair
trial, to jury trial, the right to remain silent and other trial rights?
J. Has the procedure been condemned in the courts? In the literature? For what reasons? If it
has been upheld, explain why the procedure was challenged and the reasons for upholding
it.
K. Are there statistics indicating how often the procedure has been used? If so, please
summarize.
L. How long have these procedures been in effect? Have they undergone substantial
changes?
VIII. Abbreviated Trial Procedures not Involving Admissions or Stipulations of Guilt
A. May the defendant agree to an abbreviated trial in exchange for a reduction in the
punishment? If so, explain at what stage of proceedings the decision is made. May the
aggrieved party, the prosecutor, or the court compel the defendant to stand trial according
to the ordinary procedure?
B. Briefly describe the procedure, i.e., is the trial based on the contents of the preliminary
investigation dossier? May the defendant testify? May witnesses be called?
C. Are there statutorily fixed discounts for choosing this procedure? If not, are the discounts
negotiated by the prosecution and defense before the abbreviated trial? If not, are their
fixed tariffs?
D. May the prosecutor compel an abbreviated procedure sua sponte or by the way he or she
charges the case? If so, is it regulated by statute? Describe the procedure briefly?
E. Have these procedures been criticized by the courts? In the literature? For what reasons?
Have they been upheld by the courts? Explain briefly the grounds on which they were
challenged and the grounds upon which upheld?
F. Are there statistics indicating how often the procedure has been used and in what kind of
cases? Explain.
G. How long have the procedures been in effect? Have they undergone substantial change?
IX. Confession Bargaining at Trial (or Otherwise Bargaining to Simplify the Trial)
A. Can the prosecutor, defendant, or even court, engage in discussions aimed at shortening or
simplifying the trial by encouraging the defendant to confess, or otherwise not to present
certain evidence? (Like German Absprachen). If so, briefly explain how these negotiations
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take place and whether the court is allowed to participate and how. Do the lay assessors or
the jury get involved in these negotiations?
Is the practice regulated by statute or court decision, or does it take place informally?
Explain the different types of trial-simplifying agreements which may be made.
May the prosecutor agree to reduce the charges? May the judge agree to a particular
imposition of punishment? Is the agreement put on the record? May it be enforced if
violated by the defendant or the court? May it include a promise not to appeal or to give up
any other important statutory or constitutional rights other than the right to remain silent or
to present evidence?
May the aggrieved party object to the agreement?
Have these procedures been criticized by the courts? In the literature? On what grounds?
Have they been upheld by the courts? Against which attacks? On what reasons?
How long have these procedures been in effect? Have they undergone substantial change?

X. Historical Perspective
A. Is there evidence of consensual procedures in your country at any time in the past, which
were subsequently superseded by other forms of procedure? Such as compositions, wergeld,
mechanisms of restitution, etc.
B. Does your country still have areas governed by customary law in which consensual
procedures for resolving criminal disputes still may be applied? Example: among the
Miskito Indians in Nicaragua. If so, have these procedures had any influence on the reforms
in the national criminal justice system?
C. Have consultants or representatives from other countries or international organizations
played a role in the introduction of any of the forms of consensual procedure discussed
above in your country? I.e. experts from the United States, Germany, the Council of Europe,
the United Nations, etc.
D. Briefly summarize the effectiveness of the consensual procedures within the context of the
normal procedures for resolving criminal cases, their reception among legal practitioners,
legal scholars and the general public, and the prospects for further reforms in the future.

Appendix 2
Codes of Criminal Procedure
Armenia (AR)
Belarus (BE)

Bolivia (BO)
Chile (CH)
Estonia (ES)
France (FR)

Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy kodeks Respubliki Armenii, http://www.
parliament.am/legislation.php?sel=show&ID=1450&lang=rus
Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy Kodeks Respubliki Belarus’. Priniat Palatoy
predstaviteley 24 June 1999. Odobren Sovetom Respubliki 30 June 1999.
Yuridicheskiy tsentr Press. 2001. St. Petersburg. Augmented by web version
with changes of to July 22, 2003.
Código de Procedimiento Penal Bolivia. Ley No.1970, Ley del 25 de marzo
1999.
Código Procesal Penal, Ley 19,696, Sept. 29, 2000, Final modification, Ley
19, 762, Oct. 13, 2001.
Code of Criminal Procedure, RT 1, 2003, 166, Passed February 12, 2003,
amended Dec. 17, 2003.
Code de Procédure Pénale, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/
UnCode?code=CPROCPEL.rcv (Last viewed 17 June 2006).
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Georgia (GR)

Chapter LXIX, amending the Georgian Code of Criminal Procedure, signed
into law Feb. 13, 2004 by President Mikheil Saakashvili.
Honsuras (HO)
Código Procesal Penal, Norma 9-99-E
Kazakhstan (KA) Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy Zakon Respublika Kazakhstan. Almaty: Yurist
(2003). Changes up to Sept. 25, 2003. Originally passed Dec. 13, 1997. No.
206-I.
Latvia (LA)
Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy zakon. Adopted by the Seym. April 21, 2005
and Proclaimed by the President of the Government on May 11, 2005. With
changes as of January 19, 2006. BIB. “Biznesa inform~cijas birojs”. Riga.
2006. Translated by “Biznesa inform~cijas birojs”.
Lithuania (LI)
Code of Criminal Procedure Baudziamojo proceso kodekso palvirtinimo ir
igvendimino Entered into force May 1, 2003.
Model Code of Criminal Procedure for the Commonwealth of Independent States (MCCIS).
Model’nyy ugolovno-protsessual’niy kodeks dlia stran SNG. Feb. 17, 1996.
Kommissiia mezhparlamentskoy Assambleiey Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh
Gosudarstv. Informatsionnyy biulleten’ 1996. No. 10. Appendix.
Moldova (MO)
Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy kodeks Respubliki Moldova. S.A. Cartea,
Kishinev 2003). No. 122-XY. March 14, 2003. Went into force June 12,
2003.
Nicaragua (NI)
Código Procesal Penal de la Republica de Nicaragua, Ley No. 406, Signed
by President Dec. 18, 2001.
Panama (PA)
Código Judicial. Libro Tercero, Proceso Penal.Gaceta Oficial. March 10,
1987.
Paraguay (PAR) Código Procesal Penal, signed by President of the Republic July 8, 1998.
Russian Soviet Socialist Federated Republic (RSFSR)
Ugolovnyy-protsessual’nyy kodeks RSFSR, Affirmed by Supreme Soviet
of the RSFSR. Oct. 27, 1960 published in Zakony RSFSR i Postanovleniia
Verkhovnogo soveta RSFSR. Moscow: Supreme Soviet RSFSR (1960)
Russia (RU)
Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Os’ 89 Moscow
2006). With amendments up to January 9, 2006.
Tadzhikistan (TA) Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy kodeks Respubliki Tadzhiskistan. August 17,
1961. Dushanbe.
Turkmenistan (TU) Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy kodeks Turkmenistana (Proekt)
Uzbekistan (UZ) Ugolovno-protsessual’nyy kodeks Respubliki Uzbekistan. Confirmed by
Law of RU of 9.22.94, No. 2013-XII, went into effect on April 1, 1995.
Last amendment by N. 254_II on 8.29.2001.
Venezuela (VE)
Código Orgánico Procesal Penal, Gaceta Oficial # 5208, Jan. 23, 1998. As
revised in 2001.

